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Charles W. Mooney Jr.*
Abstract
This article addresses the codification of the law applicable to the creation, perfection,
priority, and enforcement of security rights in movable assets–the relevant ‘choice-of-
law’ or ‘private international law’ rules (STCOL rules) for secured transactions. The
STCOL rules are a core element of secured transactions law. The article offers a frame-
work for the assessment of existing and proposed future rules and their relationship to
the substantive law of secured transactions, thereby illuminating an underdeveloped and
under-theorized area of the law. The framework takes account of the emerged and
emerging modern principles of secured transactions law, as epitomized by the recently
completed UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions. Application of the frame-
work involves an analysis of the interests of the various stakeholders affected by secured
transactions law–assignees (secured creditors), assignors (grantors), third-party obligors
(such as obligors on receivables owed to grantors), other third parties such as an assign-
or’s creditors, transferees, and insolvency representative, and States that enact and apply
secured transactions laws, including the STCOL rules. It considers the manner and extent
to which STCOL rules take account of the stakeholder interests and serve the substantive
rules of secured transactions laws.
I. Introduction
This article examines the law applicable to secured transactions and, in particular,
the codification of the law applicable to the various aspects of secured transac-
tions. It draws both inspiration and guidance from the 2016 UNCITRAL Model
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Law on Secured Transactions (Model Law).1 Choice-of-law rules lie at the heart of
the emerged and emerging modern principles of secured transactions law (which I
refer to here as the Modern Principles2) for personal property (movable assets).3
The penumbra of these secured transactions choice-of-law rules (STCOL rules)
extends beyond secured transactions law per se to the law of property (real) rights
more generally. Yet, the bases for these STCOL rules and their relationship
to related substantive legal doctrine remain somewhat underdeveloped and
under-theorized.
This article seeks to remedy this situation or at least to take steps towards that
end. It situates the STCOL rules as fundamental components of secured transac-
tions law and central to understanding the normative principles and factual as-
sumptions that underpin that important body of law. Its principal contribution is
to offer a framework for assessing the existing STCOL rules and for the codifica-
tion of such rules in the future. The framework is based on the interests of
stakeholders that participate in, or are affected by, secured transactions and the
Modern Principles. These stakeholders include not only parties to, and affected
by, transactions but also the States that would adopt and apply the STCOL rules.
This framework also illuminates the factual determinations and assumptions
necessary to apply the framework and to evaluate these choice-of-law rules,
thereby providing measurable standards for their assessment.
The scope of this article does not permit an exhaustive analysis of the STCOL
rules for every aspect of secured transactions and for every type of asset. But it
does aspire to outline a framework and methodology for guiding future work in
this important area of investigation and codification. This framework can be
tested here only through its application and analysis. And this application neces-
sarily produces an assessment of STCOL rules and conclusions, albeit tentative
ones, as to the rules that should be adopted. But, this application must be based on
the essential factual assumptions concerning the interests of stakeholders and
their relationships to the Modern Principles. With this in mind, the conclusions
that I reach here on the merits of various existing and potential STCOL rules
represent only a modest contribution to the literature based on one person’s
judgments. The more important offering is the framework for assessment—the
identification of the questions to be asked and answered.
By focusing on the interests of stakeholders in secured transactions and the
Modern Principles, the framework proposed here generally is compatible with the
1 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Secured
Transactions (1 July 2016), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.
pdf (Model Law). The Model Law was inspired by its predecessor, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide
on Secured Transactions (2007), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-
82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-10English.pdf (Guide). In July 2017 UNCITRAL approved the
draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, which will
be published shortly (see A/CN.9/914 and Add. 1-6).
2 For a summary description of the Modern Principles, see pp 5–6 below.
3 For present purposes personal property or movable assets generally refers to all tangible and
intangible property other than immovable property (real estate, land and buildings, etc.).
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‘most significant relationship’ approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws (Restatement Second),4 guided by the principles of its section 6.5
However, the project here is not to consider how a court might employ the
principles of section 6 to determine the applicable law but, instead, to consider
the role of a lawmaker (legislator or regulator) in the process of codifying the
STCOL rules. While the factors listed in section 6 provide flexibility (perhaps too
much so, according to some6), the stakeholders in the secured transactions setting
require certainty from the rules, even at the cost of being over- or under-inclusive
in particular factual scenarios.
At the outset, it is useful to provide a brief explication of the terminology used
in this article. The prototypical secured transaction involves an assignor of an
interest, a security interest or security right,7 in personal property, the encum-
bered asset, to an assignee for the purpose of securing an obligation—the secured
obligation, which typically (but not necessarily) is an obligation of the assignor to
the assignee. The assignor often may be referred to elsewhere as a grantor8 or
debtor,9 and the assignee referred to as a secured creditor10 or secured party.11
The more neutral (assignor/assignee) nomenclature is used here because in some
secured transactions the assignor is an outright seller of the encumbered asset to
an assignee that is the buyer of the encumbered asset. In these outright transfer
4 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (American Law Institute 1977).
5 See, e.g., ibid s 188(1) (rights and duties in contract determined by law of State with ‘most sig-
nificant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6’).
Restatement Second section 6 provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own
state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of
law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies
of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified ex-
pectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predict-
ability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied.
6 See, e.g., Friedrich K Juenger, ‘A Third Conflicts Restatement?’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 403,
410 (noting Restatement Second was ‘vague and unprincipled’ and allowed courts to ‘select ... rules
of decision which they found most useful’, which was ‘the principal reason why judges like it and
academics detest it’).
7 The remainder of the essay refers to a ‘security right’, the defined term used in the Model Law.
‘Security right’ means:
(i) A property right in a movable asset that is created by an agreement to secure payment or
other performance of an obligation, regardless of whether the parties have denominated it as a
security right, and regardless of the type of asset, the status of the grantor or secured creditor,
or the nature of the secured obligation; and
(ii) The right of the transferee under an outright transfer of a receivable by agreement.
Model Law art 2(kk). See also United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 1-201(b)(35)
(defining ‘security interest’); Ontario Personal Property Security Act, RSO 1990, c. P.10
(OPPSA) 1(1) (defining ‘security interest’).
8 This is the term used in the Model Law. Model Law art 2(o).
9 This is the term used in UCC Article 9. UCC 9-102(a)(28).
10 This is the term used in the Model Law. Model Law art 2(ff).
11 This is the term used in UCC Article 9. UCC 9-102(a)(73).
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transactions, there is no ‘secured’ obligation (and, thus, no debtor, ‘secured’
creditor, or ‘secured’ party). Instead, there is a transfer of complete ownership.
These outright transfer secured transactions typically involve an encumbered
asset that is a right to payment owed by a third party, a third-party obligor, to
the assignor and the sale of that right to payment to the assignee. Such a right to
payment is commonly referred to as the assignor’s receivable.
The STCOL rules supply the applicable law to the various steps or components
of secured transactions. The first component (but not necessarily temporally so,
in a transactional context) is the creation of the security right, which encompasses
the validity, effectiveness, and enforceability of the security right as between the
assignor and assignee. A second is the perfection of the security right, which refers
to the effectiveness of the security right as against third parties, such as the general
creditors of the assignor, a judgment creditor of the assignor, and the assignor’s
insolvency representative (for example, trustee in bankruptcy or insolvency ad-
ministrator). A third component is the priority of the security right, which refers
to its ranking as among competing interests in the same item of property.
A final element of a secured transaction is the enforcement of the security right.
This refers to the process through which the assignee resorts to the encumbered asset
for acquiring and allocating value towards the satisfaction of the secured obligation.
For goods,12 this typically involves the assignee’s disposition (for example, sale) of
the encumbered asset and application of the net proceeds towards satisfaction of the
secured obligation. For other types of encumbered assets, however, enforcement
involves another element—enforcement of the encumbered asset itself against the
third-party obligor owing performance under the encumbered asset. Such third
party-obligation assets (TPO assets) include receivables, mentioned above, as to
which the third-party obligor may be referred to as a debtor of the receivable13 or
an account debtor.14 TPO assets also include negotiable instruments, negotiable
documents (such as warehouse receipts and bills of lading, the obligor being the
issuer of the document), securities (both certificated and uncertificated, the obligor
being the issuer of the security), and the rights of an account holder in respect of a
securities credited to a securities account maintained with a securities intermediary
(such as a stockbroker or bank, the obligor being the intermediary). Figure 1 illus-
trates an assignment of TPO assets and identifies the relevant obligors.15
12 The Model Law does not define or use the term ‘goods’, which is borrowed here from North
American law. See UCC 9-102(a)(44) (defining ‘goods’ in part as ‘all things that are movable
when a security interest attaches’, but excluding all forms of intangible property and also property
otherwise defined in UCC Article 9); OPPSA 1(1) (defining ‘goods’). The Model Law defines ‘tan-
gible asset’ as ‘any tangible movable asset’. Model Law art 2(ll). The definition provides that except as
used in provisions dealing with what we commonly understand to be goods (e.g., the provisions on a
commingled mass or product and acquisition financing), ‘the term includes money, negotiable
instruments, negotiable documents and certificated non-intermediated securities’. Ibid.
13 This is the term used in the Model Law. Model Law art 2(i).
14 This is the term used in United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. UCC
9-102(a)(3).
15 There are other types of third-party-obligation assets (TPO) assets not mentioned in Figure 1. But
Figure 1 identifies the major types of TPO asset and third-party obligors and is sufficient to
support the discussion of the STCOL rules addressed here.
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The Model Law and its direct ancestors (or close cousins, depending on one’s
perspective), Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and the various
personal property security acts (PPSAs) adopted by Canadian provinces16 (to-
gether, sometimes referred to here as North American law or laws) epitomize the
‘modern principles’ of secured transactions law to which I refer. While no State has
yet adopted the Model Law as such, it embraces (as does North American law)
principles that are widely reflected in other model laws,17 in other secured trans-
actions ‘reforms’ that have been adopted by many States over recent years,18 and
that are currently being considered by other States.19 Of course, disagreements
Obligors on TPO Collateral:  (i) debtor or account 
debtor on receivable, (ii) person obligated on negotiable 
instrument, (iii) issuer/bailee on document of title, (iv) 
issuer of certificated or uncertificated security, (v) 




Figure 1. Assignment of TPO Collateral
16 See, e.g., OPPSA. Concerning choice-of-law rules, OPPSA is typical of the Canadian Provincial
PPSA. See Deborah S Grieve, ‘Cross-Border Security Interests: Choice of Law in Canada’ (2011) 44
Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal 63, 64: ‘[P]rovincial PPS choice of law rules are almost
identical to each other. ... comments [in this article] with respect to the OPPSA choice of law
provisions will generally be applicable to the PPS laws across Canada.’
17 See, e.g., European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Model Law on Secured
Transactions (2004), available at http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/guides/model-law-
on-secured-transactions.html; Organization of American States, Model Inter-American Law on
Secured Transactions, available at https://www.oas.org/dil/Model_Law_on_Secured_
Transactions.pdf. In this connection the enormously successful Cape Town Convention (CTC)
and its Aircraft Protocol (AP) also should be mentioned, although they involve an object-based
registry rather than an assignor identifier-based registry, as contemplated by the Modern
Principles. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 2001, 2307 UNTS
285 (CTC); Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment 2001, 2367 UNTS 517. Since entering into force on 1
March 2006, the CTC and AP have been adopted by 73 contracting States and one regional
economic integration organization (European Union). UNIDROIT, ‘Status of the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment’ <http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown>
accessed 1 July 2017.
18 E.g., Colombia, Ley No.1676 del 20 de Agosto de 2014 ‘Por la Cual se Promueve el Acceso al
Crédito y se Dictan Normas sobre Garantı́as Mobiliarias’; See Mayer Brown, ‘Colombia’s New Law




19 These states currently include, e.g., Chile, Jordan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and St. Lucia. E-Mail from
Andres F Martinez, Senior Financial Sector Specialist, World Bank Group, to Charles W Mooney
Jr, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (1 July 2017, 08:34 EDT) (on file with
author); E-Mail from Murat Sultanov, Secured Transactions Specialist, World Bank Group, to
Charles W Mooney Jr, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (1 July 2017, 07:41 EDT)
(on file with author).
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exist, and debates continue as to a host of specific and recurring issues in secured
transactions law. But there is little doubt that there has emerged a global consensus
as to a set of general principles to which secured transactions law should adhere,
although for any given State the political realities may inhibit full implementation
of these principles, and disagreements on details necessarily persist.
Of course, no listing of Modern Principles would (or could) provide an ideal or
perfect taxonomy, free from all error, controversy, and debate. Under any plaus-
ible catalogue of principles, differing views also no doubt exist as to the optimal
level of detail in articulating them and as to the relative significance of the indi-
vidual principles. That said, for present purposes, I would propose the following
as the Modern Principles:
(i) public notice as a general condition for third-party effectiveness (perfec-
tion), including:
(x) establishment of an assignor identifier-based security rights registry
for registration of notices of security rights (a so-called ‘notice-filing’
system), thereby enhancing transparency and supporting and legitimizing
effective nonpossessory security rights, and
(y) continued recognition of the historical effectiveness of possession of
tangible assets for this purpose;
(ii) provision of clear and predictable priority rules to enhance certainty;
(iii) facilitation of the enforcement of security rights following a debtor-assi-
gnor’s default.
(iv) making available as encumbered assets all types of personal property,
including future assets, securing future obligations;
(v) free assignability of receivables;
(vi) comprehensive coverage of all forms of security devices;
(vii) the general extension of security rights to the proceeds of encumbered
assets (i.e., to what is received on the exchange of or collection of encum-
bered assets); and
(viii) the general acceptance of freedom of contract for relations between assi-
gnors and assignees.
This listing presents the Modern Principles in roughly their order of importance
or significance to the operation of an effective secured transactions regime. The
analyses of stakeholder interests presented in this section and the assessments of
STCOL rules in section III proceed in this order. (But one need not be overly
concerned with this order of significance, as substantial incorporation of each of
the principles is essential). Principles (i) and (ii) reflect the importance of balan-
cing the interests of assignees with the interests of third parties, such as an assi-
gnor’s creditors and buyers of encumbered assets from assignors. Principle (iii)
recognizes the crucial role of the enforcement of a security right as the means of
recovering value from the encumbered assets. Principles (iv), (v), and (vi) reflect
the significance of a broad and expansive scope of a security rights. And Principle
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(vii) acknowledges the need for flexibility in the contractual relations of parties to
secured transactions, as is the case for commercial transactions more generally.
The overarching thesis of this article is that the STCOL rules should serve the
substance and goals of the Modern Principles.20 But that is not to say that the
STCOL rules are somehow of a status that is inferior to the relevant substantive
legal doctrine. Indeed, because contemporary secured transactions traverse bor-
ders, involve transactions among market participants of many nationalities and
locations, and cover assets with connections to multiple jurisdictions, the STCOL
rules are an indispensible and core component of secured transactions law.
Because the STCOL rules should serve and support the other Modern
Principles, however, they are sui generis.21 When necessary for this support, the
rules must enthusiastically diverge from traditional doctrines of private interna-
tional law. Both substantive secured transactions law and the STCOL rules should
serve the needs of the market participants and facilitate secured transactions. It
follows that those who bring knowledge and experience with secured transactions,
including the relevant legal doctrine and transactional contexts, have the most to
offer in the discourse on STCOL rules. But development of the STCOL rules also
must build on and accept guidance from the rich scholarship and traditions of
private international law. Thus, it also follows that secured transactions mavens
who appreciate the goals—and central role—of the STCOL rules have the most to
contribute to the dialogue.
Following this introduction, section II of the article addresses the interests of the
principal stakeholders affected by the STCOL rules. It identifies the assumptions
that underlie the identification and analysis of stakeholder interests, including the
simplifying assumption of widespread adoption of the Modern Principles. II also
addresses and explains the potential value of harmonized STCOL rules even in the
absence of the general acceptance of the Modern Principles. It then identifies the
relevant stakeholders affected by STCOL rules and their respective interests.
Section III then assesses various potential STCOL rules for each major type of
encumbered asset by examining these rules for each component of secured trans-
actions law—perfection, priority, creation, enforcement against the assignor, and,
for TPO encumbered assets, enforcement against obligors. Consistent with the
article’s thesis, the principal normative standards for assessing STCOL rules are
the extent to which those rules would further the Modern Principles and balance
the interests of stakeholders. Along the way, section III also considers the STCOL
rules under the Model Law and North American law by applying the interest-of-
20 This reflects what Symeon Symeonides has called ‘result-selective statutory choice of law rules’.
Symeon C Symeonides Codifying Choice of Law around the World (Oxford University Press 2014)
251 (Symeonides, Codifying): Result-selective rules . . . are specifically designed to accomplish a
certain substantive result that is considered a priori desirable. More often than not, this result is
favored by the domestic law of not only the enacting state, but also the majority of states that
partake in the same legal tradition. Ibid.
21 Given this context, for convenience the references here to the Modern Principles generally are to
their substantive components. But the STCOL rules nonetheless are a crucial to the Modern
Principles.
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stakeholders-based and Modern Principles-based framework advocated here.
Indeed, these rules provide a concrete setting for the application and testing of
the analytical framework proposed here. Section IV then concludes the article.
II. Stakeholder interests
1. Assumptions underlying analysis of stakeholder interests
This article approaches the content of STCOL rules from the general perspective
of the impact that rules would have on the various stakeholders—parties to
transactions and affected States. This approach is particularly apt inasmuch the
Modern Principles incorporate substantive rules that reflect a balance of the
interests of the various stakeholders.22 The analysis entails consideration of
the potential effects on stakeholders of any particular STCOL rule. However,
without the aid of simplifying assumptions, the identification and assessment
of such effects would be impractical, if not impossible. This is because any stake-
holder’s views on a particular rule will be (at least) a function of, inter alia, (i) the
substantive rule that most favours that stakeholder’s situation in a particular case
(or in typical cases for that stakeholder); (ii) the STCOL rule that would point to
the law of a State that has adopted that substantive rule; and (iii) the case being
before (or assumed in the future to be before) a forum in a State that has adopted
that STCOL rule.
Consider an example. Assume (as I will claim below) that the optimal STCOL
rule for perfection of a security right in a receivable would point to the law of the
State of an assignor’s location (for example, its principal place of business or
domicile). Assume further that State A’s substantive law on secured transactions
is poor (including few if any of the Modern Principles), and State A’s political
climate makes reforms in the near to medium term unlikely. Also assume that
many State A-domiciled exporters have receivables governed by the laws of States
with modern secured transactions laws (for example, the USA and Canada).
Under these conditions, State A rationally might favour adoption (or, perhaps
more likely, retention) of a STCOL rule under which the law governing a receiv-
able (as opposed to the assumed-to-be-optimal law of the assignor’s location)
would apply to perfection of the assignment of a receivable. Under that STCOL
rule, the State A exporters could benefit from (presumably) lower costs afforded
by the application of US and Canadian laws to perfection and priority of their
assignments of US law and Canadian law-governed receivables. Even then, of
course, this result would depend on the issue of perfection being (or assumed
to be) before a forum that would adopt this STCOL rule (a quite plausible as-
sumption for assignors located in State A and their assignees, assuming State A
were to adopt this rule).
Given the variables, the interest-based analysis that follows assumes that the
Modern Principles, including compatible STCOL rules, will be widely adopted by
22 See draft Guide, Introduction, at 3.
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a substantial number of States. This approach recognizes that in a world where
many States have not adopted the Modern Principles, one cannot reliably offer
any a priori conclusions about the optimal shape of the STCOL rules.
Consequently, the merits of the STCOL rules will be evaluated based on this
assumption of widespread adoption. This assumption, of course, underlies the
normative basis of the STCOL rules that are included in the Model Law and North
American laws. This is not a coincidence. These STCOL rules are quite purpose-
fully addressed to the efficient operation of substantive secured transactions laws
of which they are a part. They were designed to facilitate extensions of credit at a
lower cost through secured transactions as a part of the broader codifications of
the Modern Principles.23 Of course, whether these STCOL rules actually serve the
Modern Principles—that is, whether these harmonized STCOL rules get it
‘right’—is another question!24
The simplifying assumption of widespread adoption of the Modern Principles
should not be understood to assume away the significance and role of the
STCOL rules on the basis that the substantive law is the same in every State.
First, adoption of the Modern Principles does not mean strict harmonization of
law; differences certainly would exist notwithstanding such widespread adop-
tion. Second, even if States were to adopt identical texts, judicial interpretations
could present material disparities. Third, presumably at least some States
would not adopt the Modern Principles. And, fourth, and perhaps most signifi-
cant, even in an imaginary world of strict harmonization of secured transac-
tions law, it would be necessary to specify which State’s law governs the
registration of notices of security rights (that is, where to register) and searches
of the registry.
Even in absence of the assumed widespread substantive harmonization
embracing the Modern Principles, there may be substantial value in harmon-
ization of STCOL rules. First, such harmonization would provide certainty—
both ex ante and ex post—for market participants. Second, harmonized STCOL
rules could provide incentives for States to adopt the Modern Principles.
Consider the hypothetical State A mentioned above. Embracing the optimal,
Modern Principle-based STCOL rule (perfection being governed by the location
of the assignor of a receivable), State A might be encouraged to adopt Modern
Principles so that its local assignors could reap the benefits.25 Moreover, even
23 See draft Guide, X.A.1., at 384 (‘In an efficient secured transactions regime, conflict-of-laws rules
applicable to secured transactions normally reflect the objectives of the secured transactions
regime.’).
24 In one case in particular—the Model Law’s STCOL Rule for certificated non-intermediated
securities—I argue below that the Model Law’s rule is inconsistent with its other STCOL rules
and does not gets it right. See section III.5 in this article.
25 Assuming a State’s harmonized STCOL are rules directed toward supporting the Modern
Principles as proposed here, such a State plausibly would also be wiling to adopt substantive
secured transactions laws incorporating the Modern Principles. Even assuming such adoption,
however, global developments reflect many variations on the Modern Principles, which are far
from being strictly harmonized. Perhaps even more adherence to strict harmonization could be
expected for the STCOL rules than with the substantive secured transactions laws.
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assuming widespread and substantial substantive harmonization, some aspects
of harmonized STCOL rules would remain essential as noted above—in par-
ticular, those that govern the State where registration (and searches of the regis-
try) are to occur. For this reason, efforts directed towards harmonized STCOL
rules are welcome.
With this background, the next section identifies and considers the interests
of the various stakeholders affected by STCOL rules. These interests support
the framework developed here for devising optimal rules as well as for assessing
existing and proposed rules. I do not claim that this discussion identifies
every conceivable interest that might be implicated. But the interests identified
here I believe are adequate for purposes of explaining and applying this
framework.
2. Identification of stakeholder interests
A. Third parties in general: herein of public notice and priorities
The relevant third parties generally are the existing and future (potential) cred-
itors of an assignor and transferees of relevant encumbered assets. For example,
one considering the extension of credit to an assignor will be interested in whether
assets of the assignor have been, or may be, encumbered in favour of another
person (assignee). Similarly, a prospective assignee of an asset (such as a pro-
spective buyer or secured lender of funds) from an assignor may be interested in
whether the relevant asset is the subject of a security right. These stakeholders
require a means of learning about existing and potential security rights in the
relevant assets. They also have an interest in the nature of the applicable priority
rules that would apply to a security right in the assets. For example, how would a
security right rank vis-à-vis a later-in-time judgment creditor or a good faith
purchaser?26
Above all, these third-party stakeholders require an objective, easily determin-
able, and reliable means of determining the law applicable to the perfection and
priority of security rights with respect to any relevant encumbered assets. These
STCOL will determine, for example, in which State(s) a search of a secured
transactions registry(ies) will be necessary or prudent. It also will determine
which State’s (or States’) law(s) will provide the relevant priority rules. Third
parties will benefit most from STCOL rules that identify the law of a single State
(or, at least, the laws of fewer rather than more States) governing perfection or
priority (or both). For example, an interested third party would prefer that it be
26 An interested third party will prefer that any such priority rules be ‘clear and predictable,’ as
specified in Modern Principle (ii). But given the simplifying assumption of widespread adoption
of the Modern Principles, this section of the essay focuses more narrowly on the interests of the
various stakeholders with respect to the STCOL rules, not more generally on the Modern
Principles.
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required to search the registry or consult the laws of a single State rather than
multiple States, thus lowering its transactions costs and reducing delay.27
B. Assignees
The interests of assignees (and prospective assignees28) mirror in many respects
those of third parties in general, which was just discussed. An assignee, like third
parties generally, will be interested in the law applicable to perfection and priority,
for essentially the same reasons. Likewise, an assignee will prefer that a single
State’s laws, or at least the laws of fewer rather than more States govern perfection
and priority, thus reducing costs and saving time and effort. Limiting the poten-
tial number of States’ laws that would apply to perfection and priority also will
more efficiently accommodate transactions involving encumbered assets that
have connections to many States. An actual assignee also must rely on the ap-
plicable law to ensure that it is taking the necessary steps under that law for
achieving perfection (such as registration in the security rights registry or
taking possession of encumbered assets) and priority of its security right.
The assignee’s perfection of its security right necessarily will involve as well the
steps necessary for the creation of the security right under the applicable law, so as
to be effective as between the assignor and assignee. An essential component of the
creation will be the existence of the assignor’s rights in the encumbered assets or
its power to transfer rights. The assignee also will need to ensure that its contrac-
tual relationship with the assignor is enforceable under the applicable law.
Moreover, with respect to TPO assets, the assignee need concern itself with two
other matters under the applicable law. First, it must be satisfied as to the en-
forceability under the applicable law of the third-party obligor’s obligation to the
assignor that underlies the TPO asset (for example, the obligation of a third-party
obligor to pay a receivable). Second, the assignee must consider its own right, as
assignee, to enforce that obligation against the third-party obligor under the
applicable law.
C. Assignors
The most pressing and practical interest of an assignor typically is the satisfaction
of the conditions necessary for obtaining secured credit from the assignee or
otherwise transferring the encumbered assets to a transferee for value. In that
sense, the assignor’s interests are precisely coextensive with those of the assignee,
and the STCOL rules that best accommodate the assignee interests will likewise
accommodate the assignor. Of course, as to matters for which under the
27 An international or regional registry could provide similar benefits. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
‘The Cape Town Convention’s Improbable-but-Possible Progeny Part One: An International
Secured Transactions Registry of General Application’ (2014) 55 Virginia Journal of
International Law 163. But the operation of such a registry would require the adoption of an
STCOL rule that would point to its applicability.
28 While not all prospective assignees will ultimately receive an assignment, all actual assignees were
once prospective assignees. For this reason references here to the interests of assignees as stake-
holders also include prospective assignees.
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applicable law the assignor and assignee are afforded party autonomy, each party
may prefer the law of a different State. For example, each may prefer its ‘own’
‘local’ law when the parties are located in different States. Or a party may prefer
the law of a State that it believes may be more accommodating to its own interests
(for example, a State perceived to be more ‘debtor-oriented’ or ‘creditor-
oriented’).
D. Third-party obligors on TPO assets
Consider next a third-party obligor on a TPO asset. The third-party obligor has
become bound to a prospective assignor on a receivable or negotiable instrument,
has issued a negotiable document or security to a prospective assignor, or has
credited a securities account for the benefit of its prospective assignor-account
holder. Although the third-party obligor’s obligations have become choate under
the relevant contractual (or other) arrangement and the applicable law, the ob-
ligations at that point remain unaffected by the application of the STCOL rules.
Once the assignor assigns the TPO asset to an assignee, however, one must con-
sider any impact that the application of STCOL rules may have on the third-party
obligor’s obligations. As to some of the STCOL rules, the third-party obligor has
important interests and concerns to be considered; as to others, the third-party
obligor typically will be indifferent and unaffected.
One significant potential interest of a third-party obligor on a receivable, for
example, is the issue of whether it is assignable at all.29 This often turns on
whether there are contractual or legal restrictions on the assignment that are
effective under the applicable law. The simplifying assumption made here has
swept this issue aside, however, inasmuch as one of the Modern Principles
assumed to be widely adopted is the ‘free assignability of receivables’. But im-
portant additional concerns of obligors remain nonetheless. Of paramount im-
portance to the obligor on a receivable, for example, is certainty as to whom to pay
(and how to pay, where to pay, and so on) in order to discharge and satisfy its
obligation.30 If, and to the extent that after an assignment the obligor will become
obligated to pay and perform to and for the benefit of the assignee, the obligor
requires certainty as to its obligations. In contrast, the obligor normally will have
little, if any, interest in the identity or status of the ‘ultimate’ beneficiary of its
payment and performance. For example, the priority among competing claims of
multiple assignees or the effectiveness (perfection) of the assignment(s) as against
other third parties or the assignor’s insolvency representative will be of little
consequence to the obligor. The appropriate STCOL rule in this context must
29 This discussion of receivables also is relevant for third-party obligors on other TPO assets, such as
bank accounts and securities accounts. On the other hand, the raison d’être for issuing certain
other common types of TPO assets, namely negotiable instruments and documents of title, is the
ready transferability of those items of commercial specialty. Thus, assignability is inherent and
assumed.
30 This certainty as to payment or other means of performance of obligations is likewise important to
third-party obligors on other types of TPO assets. For convenience this discussion refers to re-
ceivables and to performance by payment.
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take account of the obligor’s interests (or lack thereof) in balancing these interests
against those of the other stakeholders.
E. States
It is generally accepted that States have an interest in the shape and application of
choice-of-law rules that determine outcomes among private parties.31 But the
State interests implicated by the STCOL rules contemplated here would not
favour ‘competition’ among States, each seeking to achieve advantages over the
competing interests of other States. Given the simplifying assumption made here,
States would have a paramount interest in adopting STCOL rules that serve the
Modern Principles (as well as adopting the Modern Principles, of course). Stated
otherwise, States would have an interest in serving multi-State interests of the
international community flowing from a common acceptance of the Modern
Principles. 32
Some more-or-less self-serving State interests, of course, will not necessarily be
at odds with the multi-State acceptance of the Modern Principles. In fashioning
and adopting the STCOL rules, States may appropriately take into account such
self-serving interests in balancing the various stakeholders’ interests. For example,
in the context of property law, in general, and secured transactions, in particular,
a State has legitimate concerns with regulating transactions in property that is
physically situated within its borders.33 A State also has an interest in adopting
priority rules that promote efficiency, fairness, and predictability and that are
supportive of markets operating within the State. These concerns are related in
part to a State’s interest in protecting the rights of its citizens and residents and
those who transact business within the State. States also properly take steps to
ensure that their local laws are properly enforced and interpreted and not un-
necessarily limited in scope, including any extraterritorial scope. All of these
interests may in many situations be accommodated without impairing the mis-
sion or operation of STCOL rules that support the Modern Principles. Indeed, the
Modern Principles in many respects address these State interests (for example, by
including clear and predictable priority rules).
Some self-serving State interests may, on the other hand, conflict with the
Modern Principles. For example, a State might pursue a ‘forum-shopping’
agenda of seeking to attract business for its registry, thus generating fee revenues.
31 For example, as Symeon Symeonides has observed with respect to the Restatement Second’s ‘most
significant relationship’ principle: ‘The state with the most significant relationship is not to be
chosen by the quantity or even the closeness of its factual contacts, but rather ‘under the principles
stated in § 6,’ which include consideration of the policies and interests of the contact-states’.
Symeon C Symeonides Choice of Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 113.
32 Note that the relevant role of States for these purposes is the process of codifying STCOL
Rules—not balancing of competing State interests by a forum court seeking to determine the
appropriate applicable law to a given matter in dispute.
33 See, e.g., UCC 9-301, comment 7 (1st and 2nd paras) (location-of-asset STCOL priority rule for
tangible assets avoids problems that would result from location-of-assignor rule governing pri-
ority of judicial lien on goods located in another jurisdiction).
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To this end, it might manipulate its STCOL rules in a manner that could impair,
rather than serve, the Modern principles.
3. Balancing the stakeholder interests
Having identified the principal stakeholder interests implicated by the STCOL
rules, section III next offers a framework for assessing these rules (both existing
rules and those that might be considered for adoption in the future) based on the
Modern Principles and a balancing of stakeholder interests. It applies the frame-
work to the most important and controversial STCOL rules through an issue-by-
issue and asset type-by-asset type consideration. By this means, the assessment
seeks to balance the various stakeholder interests in the contexts of each of the
principal components of secured transactions law embodied in the Modern
Principles—perfection, priority, creation, and enforcement (as against an assi-
gnor and as against a third-party obligor). As will become apparent (and as is well
known to many readers), the STCOL rule that is appropriate for the issue
of perfection, for example, may not be appropriate for purposes of priority.
And the appropriate STCOL rule for perfection by registration may not be ap-
propriate for perfection by taking possession. In similar fashion, the optimal rule
for a particular issue involving one type of asset is not necessarily the appropriate
rule for another type of asset. The codification process thus involves a form of
‘legislative or statutory dépeçage’.34 Moreover, application of the analytical frame-
work suggested here necessarily entails making some factual assumptions about
the characteristics of the secured transactions, and their components, to which
any given STCOL rule would be applied. The analysis in section III proceeds
accordingly.
III. The framework for an interest-based and modern
principles-based assessment
This section takes up first the STCOL rules for third-party rights and issues—
namely, perfection and priority.35 Note that the first two of the Modern Principles
34 See Symeonides, Codifying (n 20) 224. Symeonides is referring to multiple aspects of a cause of
action, however, as opposed to the components of a secured transaction as contemplated here.
35 As explained above the appropriate STCOL for perfection may differ from that applicable to
priority, depending on the type of asset and method of perfection. For this reason the following
discussion addresses perfection and priority separately. One should note, however, that
perfection—third-party effectiveness—necessarily embodies the concept of priority inasmuch
as the essence of a perfected security right implies priority over general creditors (including
judgment creditors). Note also that this essay does not take up in any detail certain ‘special’
perfection and priority STCOL rules, such as for goods normally used in more than one jurisdic-
tion, goods in transit from one State to another State, bank accounts, intellectual property,
securities (but see the treatment of non-intermediated securities in section III.5 below), etc. It
also does not address the temporal components of STCOL rules. See, e.g., Model Law art 88(1)
(location of asset at time enforcement is commenced); 91 (time for determination of location of
asset or assignor). Moreover, it does not deal with the treatment of changes in factors that deter-
mine the applicable law. See, e.g., Model Law art 91(2) (change in location of asset or assignor). All
of these aspects of STCOL rules would benefit from the application of the interest-based and
Modern Principles-based framework for assessment proposed here.
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address these attributes of secured transactions law. Although the listing of the
Modern Principles presented here may not reflect precisely their order of import-
ance, most would agree that the third-party issues addressed by perfection and
priority rules represent the signature, touchstone issues for secured transactions
law—and, consequently, for the STCOL rules.
1. Perfection
A. Perfection by registration
(i) Intangible assets (herein of receivables and other intangibles)
For perfection by registration of a security right in receivables,36 the interests of
third parties in general (essentially as searchers) as well as assignees and assignors
(as actual parties to a secured transaction and registration of a notice) would be
served best by the general applicability of the law of a single State that is easily and
objectively determinable.37 But the determination of which (single) State’s law
ought to govern requires some factual assumptions about these secured transac-
tions. For example, on the assumption that the paradigmatic transaction involves
numerous receivables (a so-called ‘bulk’ assignment) that are connected to many
States, an asset-centric (that is, receivables-oriented) STCOL rule based on con-
nections between the receivables and those States likely would not satisfy the
needs of these stakeholders. Such a rule might contemplate searches and regis-
trations in a multiplicity of States for a single transaction with a single assignor.
Instead, an assignor-centric rule based on objectively determinable characteristics
of the assignor would be more appropriate.38 This is, of course, the general
STCOL rule that the Model Law and North American law provide—perfection
36 As used here ‘receivable(s)’ refers generally to rights to payment that are not evidenced by a
negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note. Typical rights to payment that are the subject
of commercial financing transactions include those arising out of the sale of goods or services, but
the term is not so limited as used here. See, e.g., Model Law art 2(dd) (defining ‘receivable’); UCC
9-102(a)(2) (defining ‘account’), (11) defining ‘chattel paper’), (61) (defining ‘payment
intangible’).
37 For discussions of the STCOL rules for assignments of intangibles see the presentations (2017
Colloquium Presentations) prepared for a panel on the Law Applicable to the Proprietary Effects
of Assignments of Receivables, at the Fourth International Colloquium on Secured Transactions,
15–17 March 2017, Vienna, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/4thint.
html: Maria Vilar Badia, ‘The Law Applicable to Third-Party Effects of Transactions in Claims
and Securities in EU Law’; Yuko Nishitani, ‘Cross-Border Assignments of Receivables: Conflict of
Laws in Secured Transactions’; Christian Heinze, ‘The Law Applicable to Proprietary Effects of
Assignment of Receivables and Insolvency’; Eva Lein, ‘BIICL Study Assignment and the Rome I
Regulation: Effectiveness of an Assignment of a Claim against Third Parties and Priority of the
Assigned Claim’; Catherine Walsh, ‘The Law Applicable to the Proprietary Effects of Assignments
of Receivables: Introduction’; Peter Winship, ‘The Law Applicable to Proprietary Effects of
Assignments of Receivables’.
38 An assignee-centric rule also could address the problem of a multiplicity of governing laws,
assuming a single assignee, but interested third parties would have no way of objectively ascer-
taining the identity, and thus the characteristics, of the assignee (or all conceivable assignees).
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of a security right in receivables (and intangibles generally) is governed by the law
of the location of the assignor.39
Given this assumed paradigm, the more ‘traditional’ asset-centric rule that
would apply the law governing the receivable (the assignor’s claim against the
obligor) to govern proprietary rights arising out of the assignment would be
inappropriate. That law-governing-claim STCOL rule would invite precisely
the multiple searches and registrations in multiple States that third parties, assi-
gnors, and assignees alike would most wish to avoid. Moreover, this would re-
quire legal due diligence as to each such State, and some of those States may not
have registration-based perfection and priority rules.40 Unfortunately, this law-
governing-claim STCOL rule persists in several jurisdictions.41 Moreover, that
traditional asset-centric rule could not accommodate with any certainty the
coverage of future receivables because it would be impossible to determine the
law governing a claim that does not yet exist.42 Of course, these difficulties of
dealing with multiple States and registries would be substantially eliminated if the
law governing all of the assigned receivables happened to be the law of the same
State. For example, a multinational firm might have sufficient bargaining power
to ensure that its preferred applicable law governed all (or almost all) of its
39 Model Law art 86; UCC 9-301(1); OPPSA 7(1) (law of jurisdiction of location of debtor governs
perfection and priority for intangible assets, mobile goods, and negotiable assets). It also is the
STCOL rule under the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in
International Trade 2001 (New York) http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receiv-
ables/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf (Receivables Convention). Receivables Convention arts
22, 30(1). Under the Receivables Convention perfection is subsumed for this purpose under the
concept of priority. Receivables Convention art 5(g) (defining ‘priority’). For a thorough analysis
supporting adoption of the location-of-assignor STCOL rule, with appropriate exceptions, see
Harry C Sigman and Eva-Maria Kieninger, eds, Cross-Border Security over Receivables (2009)
46–73. More recently, Catherine Walsh has provided an utterly convincing analysis and argument
supporting the location-of-assignor STCOL rule. Catherine Walsh, ‘The Law Applicable to the
third-Party Property Effects and Priority of an Assignment: Whither the EU?’ (2017) [cite this
issue] (Walsh, ‘Assignment’). Notwithstanding the simplicity of such a ‘one-size-fits-all’ loca-
tion-of assignor STCOL rule, one can imagine real-world examples to which a law-govern-
ing-claim rule would be more convenient for assignees. For example, if the same receivable is
assigned multiple times (assignee 1 to assignee 2 to assignee 3, etc.), with each assignee located in a
different state, this would require each successive assignee to search in its assignor’s location and in
the locations of earlier assignors in the chain. No single STCOL rule would best accommodate the
interests of every assignee in all scenarios.
40 This could negate the economic viability of many multistate assignment transactions.
41 See, e.g., Christian Heinze and Cara Janine Warmuth*, ‘The Law Applicable to Proprietary Effects
of Assignment and Its Interplay with Insolvency’ (2017) (Heinze, ‘Law Applicable’) [this issue];
Yuko Nishitani, ‘Cross-Border Assignment of Receivables–Conflict of Laws in Secured
Transactions’ (2017) (Nishitani, ‘Cross-Border’) [this issue]; Walsh, ‘Assignment’ (n 39) xr.]
42 A thorough analysis of this ill-advised rule is beyond the scope of this essay. For additional analysis
and critique, see Heinze, ‘Law Applicable’ (n 41); Nishitani, ‘Cross-Border (n 41); Walsh,
‘Assignment’ (n 39); see also 2017 Colloquium Presentations (n 37). But it is worth noting the
weakness of one justification for an asset-centric law-governing-claim rule that sometimes is
offered in its support. It is argued that the assignee must examine the law governing an assigned
receivable in any event in order to determine, inter alia, the validity of the assignor’s claim against,
and the corresponding obligation of, the third-party obligor. But such a straightforward exam-
ination (in lieu of which assignees in bulk assignments normally rely on representations of the
assignor) would not entail an examination of the relevant State’s secured transactions regime,
including its rules on perfection (registration) and priority. Moreover, that purported justification
does not come to grips with the potential burdens of searching and registration in multiple
jurisdictions.
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receivables.43 And its preferred applicable law might well be the law of the State of
its location. Under that scenario, the same law would apply to perfection by
registration under either of the posited STCOL rules. Conversely, however, it is
also plausible that the obligors on an assignor’s receivables would have the su-
perior bargaining power. This could lead to each receivable being governed by the
law preferred by the obligor of the receivable, once again resulting in a multiplicity
of governing laws (and States in which searches and registrations would be
necessary).
Now adjust the assumed paradigmatic transaction. Assume it to be the assign-
ment of a single receivable (such as a payment stream under a lease of an expen-
sive item of equipment) by a ‘special purpose entity’ that was created for the sole
purpose of acquiring and leasing the equipment to the obligor (lessee). Under this
paradigm, the assignee and assignor would be agnostic as to whether a law-gov-
erning-claim (that is, the law governing the receivable, the lease) STCOL rule or a
location-of-assignor rule were the law governing perfection by registration—in
either case, the law of a single State that is readily determinable (by them) would
apply. But third parties that might have an interest in the assignor’s affairs (that is,
whether it has assigned any of its assets), would have no reliable and objective
means of discovering the existence of this (or any other) receivable—much less its
governing law under a law-governing-claim STCOL rule. In the real world, it
must be the case that both of the assumed paradigmatic transactions patterns
giving rise to receivables actually occur as well as the more probable situation—
assignors with many receivables that fall in between these polar examples. An
appropriate STCOL rule should accommodate the entire range of receivables-
generating transactions.
Consider next the situation of the interests of third parties, assignors, and as-
signees, that are ‘small,’ ‘local,’ presumably unsophisticated parties. Under the
assignor-centric location-of-assignor STCOL rule, an interested third party or
assignee may be required to search and register notices in the registry of a foreign
State of an assignor’s location—that is, a State other than the ‘home’ State of the
searching or registering party (that is, the State of that party’s place of business or
domicile). Arguably, this could impose a hardship on the local party. Given the
assumed widespread adoption of the Modern Principles, however, one might
hope that such foreign registries would be accessible and user friendly for the
local party, thus mitigating any such hardship. Moreover, under an asset-centric
rule such as the law-governing-claim STCOL rule, such local parties might be
required to deal with multiple foreign registries. This situation might be even
more burdensome than searching and registering under a location-of-assignor
rule. On the other hand, it is also plausible that the local parties generally are
43 Even with such bargaining power it is likely that for many assignors a nontrivial number of its
receivables would be governed by the law preferred (and designated) by third-party obligors on
receivables through the operation of the so-called ‘battle of the forms’. See, e.g., Giesela Ruhl, ‘The
Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations’ (2003) 24 University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 189.
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interested in, and deal with, primarily local assignors (located in the same home
State) and that the local assignors’ receivables typically are governed by the law of
that same home State. Under those hypotheses, the same law would apply under
either of the posited STCOL rules, and such local parties would not experience
material adverse effects from application of the assignor-centric location-of-
assignor STCOL rule. This analysis suggests that, on balance even in a State
where such local interests dominate the location-of-assignor STCOL rule might
well be in the best interests of third parties, assignors, and assignees.44
What of the interests of the other stakeholders—the obligors on the receivables
and potentially interested States? Assuming satisfactory STCOL rules and sub-
stantive rules that provide adequate assurance to the third-party obligors as to
whom they should pay (render performance) to satisfy their obligations,45 the
obligors would be indifferent as to the law governing perfection of the assignment
by registration. Given this, the same conclusion would apply to the States whose
laws might govern the receivables or which might be the domiciles of the obligors.
An asset-centric law-governing-claim STCOL rule might have superficial appeal
to a State whose law would govern. But the State’s actual interest would be aligned
with those of its domiciliary obligors—interests that are real and important, but
which would not extend to the issue of perfection by registration addressed here.
The assignor-centric location-of-the-assignor STCOL rule thus meets the needs
of third parties and assignors and assignees irrespective of the assumptions as to
paradigmatic receivables transactions. But that rule would not impair the inter-
ests of the third-party obligors or interested States.46
Finally, possibly the most compelling argument in support of a location-of-
assignor STCOL rule for perfection by registration for receivables is the direct
connection between the method of perfection—registration—and an assignor-
centric location-of-assignor STCOL rule. The Modern Principles contemplate a
security rights registry based on an assignor (grantor) identifier, such as the as-
signor’s name.47 Given such a registry, searchers would search according to the
44 In the case of an insolvency proceeding of the assignor it also is likely that the location of the
assignor would be the State in which a main proceeding would be commenced and administered.
See, e.g., draft Guide, X.A.5.(a), at 393; UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
(1997) http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf, art 2(b) (defining ‘foreign main proceeding; 16(3) (presumption that debtor’s
registered office is its center of main interests.
45 See section III.4.B in this article (discussing, inter alia, law governing rights and obligations of
third-party obligors).
46 A State might adopt self-serving STCOL rules that impair the Modern Principles. For example it
might opt for a rule that it perceives would attract registrations for its registry. And an asset-centric
law-governing-claim rule might be the most easily manipulated one for facilitating such ‘forum
shopping’ (i.e., it would be easier for parties to a receivable to choose a particular governing law
than for an assignor to change its location to accommodate an assignor-centric location-
of-assignor STCOL rule). But it is unclear why such a State would prefer the asset-centric to
the assignor-centric rule. Assuming (as argued here) that the latter rule provides greater benefits to
third parties and assignees (and therefor assignors) in terms of reduced searching and registration
costs and burdens, a State’s adoption of the former rule could discourage assignors from choosing
that State’s laws to govern receivables.
47 Draft Guide, recs 54(c), 58, at 179–80.
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assignor’s identifier, and assignees would register against, and registrations would
be indexed according to, that identifier. To participate in this system, an inter-
ested person necessarily must know an assignor’s identifier. Under a location-of-
assignor STCOL rule, it would be the identity of the assignor (as opposed to, for
example, characteristics of any particular assets of the assignor) that would de-
termine the State in which to search and register for assignments made by that
assignor.48
Beyond receivables, what would be the optimal STCOL rule for perfection by
registration of security rights in other (non-reified) intangibles such as bank
accounts, securities accounts, uncertificated securities, tort claims, rights under
various contractual arrangements such as franchise agreements, and intellectual
property (to the extent not covered by specialized statutes)? Would, for example,
issues involving ‘bulk’ assignments be less significant for many of these types of
assets than in the case of assignments of receivables? Some of these assets, such as
bank accounts, uncertificated securities, and securities accounts, are subject to
perfection methods other than registration under the Model Law and North
American law.49 In general, an examination of the various financing patterns
and commercial settings involving these various types of assets is beyond the
scope of this article. Nonetheless, the factors militating towards a location-of-
assignor STCOL rule for perfection for receivables would appear to be applicable
as well for perfection by registration for these other types of intangibles.
Summing up this discussion, first, the assignor-centric location-of-assignor
STCOL rule for perfection by registration of a security right in intangibles (re-
ceivables, in particular) appears to satisfy the needs of third parties as well as
assignors and assignees in all of the relevant scenarios, thus providing the least
burdensome rule for accommodating searching and registration.50 Second, third-
party obligors and States would be largely indifferent as between an assignor-
centric location-of-assignor STCOL rule and an asset-centric law-governing-
claim STCOL rule. Third, a location-of-assignor STCOL rule is directly connected
to the core organizing principle of a security rights registry—the assignor iden-
tifier as the basis for searching and registration. Fourth, and perhaps most sig-
nificant, factual assumptions about the secured transactions addressed by STCOL
rules, including the relevant assets (such as receivables) are essential to any as-
sessment of these rules. While the factual assumptions supporting these conclu-
sions seem relatively clear and straightforward, facts are both stubborn and
48 Difficulties attendant to an assignor-identifier-based system should not be underestimated, how-
ever. A person faced with searching in a foreign state must determine and obtain access to an
assignor’s identifier used by that State’s registration system, which may be a name or an official
identification number or both.
49 Model Law arts 25 (bank accounts); 27 (uncertificated securities); UCC 9-314 (deposit accounts
and investment property, including uncertificated securities and securities accounts); OPPSA 22.1
(perfection by control in investment property, including uncertificated securities and security
entitlements).
50 It is worth noting that this issue is presently being considered by the European Commission and
‘[a] legislative proposal is expected in the fourth quarter of 2017’. See Walsh, ‘Assignment’ (n 39)
xr; see also Badia (n 37) 7–8.
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elusive. The discussion of perfection by registration for tangible assets, considered
next, further illustrates the challenges of determining the factual assumptions
necessary to support appropriate STCOL rules.
(ii) Tangible assets (herein of goods and negotiable assets)
Section III.1.A.i applied the interest-based and principles-based framework pro-
posed here to the assessment of STCOL rules for perfection by registration of
security rights in intangible assets. It concluded that the assignor-centric location-
of-assignor STCOL rule best served both stakeholder interests and the Modern
Principles alike. This subsection applies the framework to perfection by registra-
tion for tangible assets. Perhaps the most efficient and effective analytical ap-
proach is to ask whether there is any basis for concluding that a different rule is
warranted for tangible assets. The analysis here suggests that the location-of-
assignor rule may be the better one for tangible assets as well as for receivables.
In this respect, it parts company with the corresponding STCOL rules provided in
the Model law and under the PPSAs, which opt for a location-of-asset rule for
tangible assets. But this conclusion is no better than the ‘best guess’ factual as-
sumptions on which it is based. Moreover, even these factual assumptions suggest
that support for the location-of-assignor rule is somewhat weaker than in the case
of receivables.
Consider first tangible assets consisting of goods. The foregoing interest-based
analysis of perfection by registration in intangible assets identified and illumi-
nated the fundamental question: which STCOL rule would provide the best guid-
ance to assignees on where to search and register?51 (One is not likely to find the
best answer by asking the wrong question.) An assignor’s goods may be located in
numerous States, just as an assignor’s receivables may be governed by the laws of
(or have other connections with) many States. As explained, the assignor-centric
location-of-assignor STCOL rule for perfection by registration for receivables
provides a single, stable, easy-to-apply, and certain rule that is most consistent
with the needs of stakeholders. Keeping in mind that the context here is perfection
by registration, are there good reasons why goods would warrant a different
STCOL rule?52
Plausible factual assumptions concerning the circumstances surrounding assi-
gnors’ goods may demonstrate that the case for a location-of-assignor rule is
51 Contrast this question with this formulation: which STCOL rule best determines ‘the law applic-
able to the proprietary effects of assignments of receivables’—taken from the title of the 2017
UNCITRAL colloquium panel (n xr). This sort of formulation may explain at least in part why the
subject of ‘conflict of laws’ sometimes meets with enormous skepticism, as evidenced by Professor
Prosser’s famous prose: ‘[C]onflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and
inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange
and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and
entangled in it.’ William L Prosser, ‘Interstate Publication’ (1953) 51 Michigan Law Review
959, 971. For myself, in this realm I must disclaim any right to the ‘learned . . . professor’ desig-
nation, although I will defer to others as to the aptness of the ‘eccentric’ and ‘lost’ appellations.
52 For goods, the ‘certainty’ consideration would take into account the costs and risks associated with
determining and relying on the location of goods when compared with the determination of the
assignor’s location.
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weaker for goods that for receivables. For example, assume that the paradigmatic
situation is that most goods of an assignor are physically located in the same State
as the assignor’s location. This situation might be typical in particular for small,
local enterprises. The location of the goods (typically, the assignor’s equipment
and inventory) outside of the assignor’s home State, on the other hand, might be
more common among assignors with truly multinational operations. But these
smaller, local firms might well undertake credit sales to foreign buyers, thus
generating receivables that would, at least potentially, be governed by foreign
laws. If these facts were the norm, then the location-of-assignor STCOL rule
would provide more benefits for receivables secured transactions than for
goods secured transactions when compared to a location-of-asset rule for goods.
Stated otherwise, the burdens of searching and registering in multiple States
would be a larger problem in the receivables context under a law-governing-claim
rule than would be the case for goods under a location-of-asset rule. But, even if
this is so—so what? The potential for multiple-State searches and registrations
requirements would remain greater for goods under a location-of-asset rule than
under a location-of-assignor rule. Even these assumed facts, which are more
favourable to a location-of-asset rule, would not necessarily demonstrate the
superiority of that rule from the perspectives of the interests of the stake-
holders—third parties, assignors, and assignees. Finally, one downside of a loca-
tion-of-assignor STCOL rule for perfection by registration is the bifurcation that
it would create between the rule for perfection (where to search and register) and
the rule for priority. As explained below, a location-of-asset STCOL rule for
tangible assets is preferable for priority.53
Now consider the situation of non-professional, unsophisticated assignees—
buyers of goods that buy outside the ordinary course of business.54 (Assignees,
including buyers, of receivables presumably are more typically sophisticated profes-
sionals.) These sale transactions may be assumed typically to take place in the State in
which the goods being transferred are located and to involve the buyer’s taking of
possession of the goods. Under these assumptions, a location-of-asset STCOL rule
would provide absolute clarity to a buyer as to the applicable law and, consequently,
as to where to search (the local registry) for earlier notices of assignments. And, even
if a location-of-assignor rule would provide equivalent clarity, these unsophisticated
buyers might find it more burdensome to cope with searches of a foreign State’s
53 See section III.2.B in this article.
54 It is assumed for this discussion that ordinary course buyers of goods from dealers in such goods
would take free of competing claims through good faith purchase rules under the law of the State
of location. Concerning the posited ‘unsophisticated’ buyers, Walsh has observed that ‘not all
third parties will have the legal acumen to appreciate that the filing venue for locally situated goods
may be located in a different state.’ Catherine Walsh, ‘Transplanting Article 9: The Canadian PPSA
Experience’ (Walsh, ‘Transplanting’) in Louise Gullifer and Orkun Akseli (eds), Secured
Transactions Law Reform: Principles, Policies and Practice (2016). One might question the likeli-
hood that an interested person would possess the acumen necessary to appreciate the need to
search (or register in) the security rights registry but would lack the acumen to determine the
proper registry for searching and registration. Again, the point here is that the assumed facts may
play a determinative role in assessing the appropriate STCOL rule.
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registry under a location-of-assignor rule.55 However, even taking into account this
potential burden on this subset of assignees imposed by a location-of-assignor rule,
one might question whether this consideration alone should outweigh the benefits of
that rule to third parties and assignees more generally.56
This prospective unsophisticated buyer scenario suggests the benefit of pursu-
ing yet additional avenues of factual inquiry: who are (or would be) the predom-
inant users of the registries and for what purposes? In particular, which searchers
and registering assignees are predominantly interested in discovering registra-
tions made against an assignor generally and which are interested in discovering
registrations affecting particular assets? Certainly, prospective buyers of goods are
interested in discovering conflicting claims to the relevant goods and would fall
into the latter, asset-focused class. Asset-focused searchers also would include
certain prospective acquisition financers who must discover and notify earlier-
registered parties in order to qualify for non-temporal priority.57 Interested third-
party searchers, however, presumably fall into the assignor-focused class. It is
plausible, and sometimes assumed, that a location-of-asset rule would favour
asset-focused searchers and registering parties, and a location-of-assignor rule
would favour the assignor-focused classes of registry users.58 But this is not ne-
cessarily the case. Asset-focused users are not invariably interested in assets
located in a single State. For example, asset-focused users might, on balance,
favour the use of a single registry under location-of-assignor rule, thus avoiding
the potential for multiple searches and registrations in several States. As in other
contexts, empirical evidence would be enormously helpful here, such as whether
55 To the extent that, as often might be the case, the assignors (sellers) of these second-hand goods in
non-ordinary course transactions are located in the State of location of the goods, then the burden
would be reduced inasmuch as the local registry would be the appropriate place to search even
under a location-of-assignor rule. It also is worth noting that experience since 2001 in the United
States with the location-of-assignor STCOL rule applicable to most tangible (as well as intangible)
assets may be sui generis. The tasks of searching and registering in a ‘foreign’ State within the
United States federal system may be substantially less burdensome than in the international con-
text involving foreign States with very different legal regimes, cultures, and languages. On the other
hand, to the extent that multinational enterprises typically operate through a separate subsidiary in
each State, searching and registering in multiple States under either the location-of-asset rule or the
location-of-assignor rule might not be problematic for third parties and assignees.
56 The prevailing facts might differ from State to State, of course. For example, market conditions
might be such that the interests of the unsophisticated non-ordinary course buyers in a given State
are dominant. Arguably that might outweigh the other benefits of the location-of-assignor rule,
meaning an interest-based analysis would favor the location-of-asset rule in that State although the
location-of-assignor rule would be more beneficial for assignees generally from a multi-State
perspective. Under these circumstances, social welfare might be enhanced by the adoption of
different STCOL rules by different States. On balance, however, I am skeptical about an approach
that would ‘slice the salami so thin’ based on such finely nuanced assumptions. I remain inclined
toward harmonized STCOL rules, imperfect as they might be.
57 See, e.g., Model Law art 38(2) (Option A) (acquisition security right priority); UCC 9-324(b), (c)
(inventory purchase-money priority); OPPSA 33(1) (inventory purchase-money priority).
58 This is implicit in the critiques of Cuming and Walsh and of Scott. Ronald CC Cuming and
Catherine Walsh, ‘Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Implications for the
Canadian Personal Property Security Acts (2001) 16 Banking and Finance Law Review 339,
359–60 (Cuming and Walsh, ‘Implications’), citing Robert E Scott, ‘The Politics of Art 9’
(1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1783, 1826–9; Walsh, Transplanting (n 54) 76.
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there are material differences in preferences as between location-of asset buyers
and buyers located in other jurisdictions.
Somewhat related to the prospective unsophisticated buyer scenario, the ap-
propriateness of a location-of-assignor STCOL rule for tangible assets in the
international context has been seriously questioned.59 A premise of this critique
is that most of the world has adopted a location-of-asset STCOL rule for tangible
property.60 But the question addressed here concerns the appropriate harmo-
nized STCOL rule under the assumption of widespread adoption of the Modern
Principles, including the relevant STCOL rules. Put differently, what rule should
be included in a model law? One cannot comfortably answer this question based
on the status quo.61
The draft Guide outlined a strong case for a location-of-assignor STCOL rule
for tangible assets. As explained there:
Simplicity and certainty considerations could even support the adoption of the same
conflict-of-laws rule (that is, the law of the grantor’s location) not only for intangible
assets but also for tangible assets, especially if the same law were to apply to the
creation, third-party effectiveness and priority of a security right. Following this ap-
proach, one single enquiry would suffice to ascertain the extent of the security rights
encumbering all the assets of a grantor.62
The draft Guide’s explanation of its rejection of the location-of-assignor rule,
however, is strained. It noted that ‘[n]ot all States, however, regard the law of the
location of the grantor as sufficiently connected to security rights in tangible
assets’.63 Whatever meaning might be imagined and attributed to ‘sufficiently
connected’ in this context, it seems to miss the point that the issue is one of
perfection by registration and the principal question presented is where to search
and register in registries that are indexed based on assignor identifiers.64 Thus, the
existence (or not) of any connection between an assignor’s location and its tan-
gible assets simply has nothing whatsoever to do with the issue and the question
59 Cuming and Walsh, Implications (n xr) 359–60.
60 Ibid at 359 (‘in Canada (and most of the rest of the world), the local conflicts regime refers choice
of law for perfection of interests in tangibles to the law of the situs of the collateral’).
61 Cuming and Walsh recognize this. The inherent risk of foreign litigation for US perfected security
interests would be eliminated if other countries were prepared to endorse the new Article 9
approach and adopt the location of the debtor as the universal choice of law rule for perfection
even in the case of tangible collateral. This is unlikely to occur. Ibid. Certainly the occurrence is
unlikely if that rule is rejected for a model law on the basis of such unlikelihood, as apparently was
the case with the Model Law.
62 Draft Guide, X.A.3., at 388. The draft Guide went on to observe: ‘There would also be no need for
guidance in the event of a change in the location of encumbered assets or to distinguish between
the law applicable to possessory and non-possessory rights (and to determine which prevails in a
case where a possessory security right governed by the law of State A competes with a non-pos-
sessory security right in the same assets governed by the law of State B).’ Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Draft Guide, recs 54(c), 58, at 179–80.
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presented.65 To question the ‘sufficient connect[ion]’ seems to question the as-
signor-based characteristic of the registry itself. The draft Guide explained fur-
ther: ‘Moreover, in many cases, adoption of the law of the grantor’s location
would result in one law governing a secured transaction and another law gov-
erning a transfer of ownership in the same assets. To avoid this result, States
would need to adopt the grantor’s-location law for all transfers of ownership.’
These comments ignore the fact that the draft Guide itself recognizes that the
law of an assignor’s location may govern perfection by registration of a security
right in tangible assets (the issue considered here) while another State’s law (lo-
cation of the asset) may govern creation and priority, each involving an attribute
of ownership.66 More fundamentally, ‘ownership’—or the more nuanced term
used in the draft Guide and Model Law, ‘power to encumber’67—is a character-
istic of an assignor’s relationship to an encumbered asset, not an attribute of a
perfected security right in that asset. Stated otherwise, a security right is created in
whatever the assignor’s rights happen to exist in the asset and the law governing
perfection need not have any connection with those underlying rights.68 The
point here is not to defend one rule or the other but, rather, to emphasize that
the interest-based and Modern Principles-based analysis advocated here would
focus on the principal issue affecting the stakeholders—the appropriate State for
searching and registration—and not on peripheral, unrelated considerations.69
The discussion of perfection by registration in tangible assets thus far has
focused on goods. Now consider tangible assets consisting of negotiable docu-
ments, negotiable instruments, and certificated non-intermediated securities (for
convenience, collectively referred to here as negotiable assets). Would the inter-
ests of third parties, assignors, and assignees best be met by a STCOL rule for
perfection by registration in negotiable assets which would designate the same
STCOL rule as that applicable to goods (whether that be the location-of-asset rule
(as provided by the Model Law) or the location-of-assignor rule)? Absent a
compelling reason, it would seem inconvenient and inappropriate—and, frankly,
quite odd—to require those stakeholders to search and register in one State for
goods and (potentially) another for negotiable assets. But the Model Law
65 As to perfection by possession (as opposed to registration) and priority with respect to tangible
assets, the connection between the location of the asset and possessory perfection and priority is
enormously important. See pp 25–26 below.
66 The Model Law provides for a location-of-assignor STCOL rule for negotiable assets (negotiable
documents, negotiable instruments, and certificated non-intermediated securities) if the law of the
State of the assignor’s location provides for perfection by registration for such assets. Model Law
art 98. However, the law of the State of the location of a negotiable asset governs creation and
priority of a security right. Ibid art 85. Creation involves an attribute of ownership, the ‘power to
encumber’ an asset, as does priority. Ibid. art 6(1) (‘power to encumber’ as requirement for
creation); 2(aa) (defining ‘priority’).
67 Ibid; draft Guide, rec 13, at 97–8.
68 See section III.3 in this article (discussing law governing creation of a security right).
69 The principal focus here is on the appropriate STCOL rule for registration in an assignor-
identifier-based registry as contemplated by the Modern Principles. Consideration of asset-based
specialized registries for tangible assets, such as those for aircraft and ships, are beyond the scope of
this essay. Concerning such specialized registries, see draft Guide, III.A.5.
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contemplates the possibility of just such an odd result. Perfection by registration
in negotiable assets may be governed by a location-of-assignor rule, while such
perfection for goods is governed by a location-of-asset rule (as discussed above).70
However, the Model Law’s rule is qualified; it imposes the location-of-assignor
rule only ‘[i]f the law of the State in which a grantor is located recognizes’ per-
fection by registration for such assets.71 Presumably this would be the case were an
adopting State to reject the Model Law’s otherwise applicable location-of-asset
rule for tangible assets, at least for such negotiable assets, in favour of a location-
of-assignor rule.72
The results of applying the interest-based and Modern Principles-based frame-
work suggested here for determining the appropriate STCOL rule for perfection
by registration for tangible assets are considerably less conclusive than in the case
of intangibles such as receivables. But this is no fault of the framework. This
indeterminacy results at least in part from gaps in our knowledge of the applicable
facts, as discussed above. (For example, who are the asset-focused searchers and
who are the assignor-focused searchers? To what extent do (or would) prospective
buyers be required to search in multiple States under location-of-asset STCOL
rules?). In this context, further empirical investigation could be enormously
worthwhile to the analysis.
Taking account of the differing interests of various subsets of the stakeholders,
and the varying interests of a given set of stakeholders in different contexts, as
discussed above, even with better knowledge of the facts on the ground, any
harmonized one-size-fits-all STCOL rule is bound to favour some and disfavour
other stakeholders. But the need for certainty as to where to search and register
demands just such a rule. In sum, under this state of play, any rule will be im-
perfect. Given this, on balance, the case for a harmonized location-of-assignor
STCOL rule for perfection by registration for tangible assets is persuasive.
Regardless of the applicable STCOL rule, searches and registrations must be ac-
complished based on the identity of the assignor in the assignor identifier-based
registries. And searches and registrations may be achieved even without any in-
formation as to the location of tangible assets. A location-of-asset STCOL rule
such as that embraced by the Model Law, on the other hand, imposes the add-
itional requirement of knowing the location of assets (which could implicate
many States) and, consequently, additional potential burdens of dealing with
the multiple registries. Finally, as discussed in connection with perfection by
70 See pp 19–26 above.
71 Model Law art 98.
72 One should keep in mind that many assignees of such negotiable assets may eschew any search and
registration altogether by taking possession of the assets in reliance on priority afforded by the
Model Law or by any innocent acquisition (good faith purchase) rules for such assets under the
applicable law. Model Law arts 85 (location-of-asset rule for priority); 46(2) (good faith purchase
‘takes free’ rule for negotiable instruments; (49(3) (good faith purchase ‘takes free’ rule for ne-
gotiable documents); 51(5) (deference to other law of enacting State for non-intermediated
securities). There appears to be no principled reason why the Model Law takes three different
approaches (with varying and differing deference to law outside the Model Law) toward innocent
acquirers of the three types of negotiable assets.
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registration for intangibles and for the same reasons,73 on balance, the interests of
third-party obligors and States would not be materially impacted, much less
impaired, by either an assignor-centric location-of-assignor STCOL rule or an
asset-centric law-governing-claim STCOL rule.
B. Perfection by possession
Pursuant to the presumed widespread adoption of the Modern Principles, the
assignee’s possession would be a permissible method of perfection for tangible
assets.74 But it is highly questionable whether physical possession of tangible
assets—by an assignor or assignee—provides any practical and meaningful com-
munication to third parties generally. Certainly, the quality of any information
conveyed by possession, in respect of any existing or future interests of the pos-
sessor, would not compare favourably with the information provided by a
modern security rights registry. Nonetheless, possession as a method of third-
party effectiveness essentially is a ubiquitous feature of most legal systems.
However questionable might be the practical impact of possession of tangible
assets as a form of public notice, from the perspective of an assignee that in fact
contemplates taking possession as a method of perfection (and the corresponding
interest of an assignor), a location-of-asset STCOL provides a clear and unmis-
takable indication of the applicable law. An assignee in possession of the asset
necessarily knows the asset’s location and, consequently, the State’s law that gov-
erns under such a rule. This clarity is a product of the direct connection between
the method of perfection, possession, and the location of the asset.75 Thus, it is
unsurprising that a location-of-asset STCOL rule is the generally accepted norm
for the law governing perfection by possession for tangible assets. This is so under
the Model Law and North American law, subject to limited exceptions.76
C. By other means
The draft Guide, the Model Law, and North American law all contemplate or
provide for methods of perfection other than registration or possession and for
corresponding STCOL rules and certain types of personal property assets, includ-
ing bank accounts, securities accounts, and uncertificated non-intermediated
securities.77 In addition, some States provide special rules for interests in other
73 See p 19 above.
74 Possession is a permissible method of perfection under the draft Guide, the Model Law, and North
American law. Model Law art 18(2); UCC 9-313(a); OPPSA 22.
75 As explained above, for perfection by registration the location-of-assignor STCOL rule also reflects
a direct connection between the method of perfection and the applicable law, inasmuch as secured
transactions registries are based on an assignor identifier. See p 25 above.
76 Model Law art 85(1); UCC 9-301(2); OPPSA 5(1). There is no apparent reason why the interests of
third-party obligors or States would support a different approach in this context. As discussed
below, the Model Law makes a notable exception for certificated non-intermediated securities. See
III.E. in this article.
77 See n 49.
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types of personal property assets, such as intellectual property.78 An assessment of
these STCOL rules is generally beyond the scope of this article. However, some of
the relevant considerations are addressed below in connection with the Model
Law’s STCOL rules for certificated non-intermediated securities.79
2. Priority
Much of the discussion of the STCOL rules for perfection applies as well to the
rules for priority. However, the STCOL rules for priority contests may implicate
special considerations that in some cases support the STCOL rules that differ
from those applicable to perfection.80
A. Intangible assets
The Modern Principles instruct that registration in the security rights registry is
the principal method of perfection for security rights in receivables and other
intangible assets. As explained below, the interests of third parties, assignors, and
assignees dictate that the STCOL rule applicable to perfection for intangibles
should apply as well to issues of priority. Moreover, the application of the
same State’s law to both perfection by registration and priority for intangibles
is appropriate irrespective of the STCOL rule (location-of-assignor, law-govern-
ing-claim, or any other rule) chosen for perfection by registration.81 The crucial
point is that the same State’s law should apply to both perfection and priority.
Adopting the same STCOL rules for perfection and priority in this context
recognizes that under the Modern Principles registration in inextricably con-
nected to priority—in particular, the generally applicable first-to-register priority
rule.82 It is that State’s registry that determines priority as well as perfection. It
follows that application of one State’s law to perfection by registration in that
State’s registry and another State’s law to priority would make little sense.83 The
reasons that would support the selection of a State’s law to apply to perfection by
registration for intangibles (and, consequently, as the appropriate State’s registry
for searches) would apply equally to the selection of that State’s law for priority.
78 See draft Guide, III.1.E (discussing specialized registries).
79 See section III.5 in this article.
80 As a reminder, perfection as used here means the effectiveness of a security right as against an
assignor’s general creditors, including judgment creditors, and insolvency representative, which is
itself a particularized priority contest. See xr below.
81 See the next following paragraph below.
82 See Model Law art 29; UCC 9-322(a); OPPSA 30(1). Even when the first-to-register priority rule
does not apply, the registry may play a crucial role for purposes of priority. For example, an
acquisition security right priority may require advance notification to assignee’s whose interests
have been registered. See n 57 Note also that the STCOL rules for priority under North American
law refer also to ‘the effect of perfection or non-perfection’, which is, essentially, priority. See, e.g.,
UCC 9-301(1); OPPSA 5(1). Curiously, for tangible assets OPPSA section 5(1) refers only to ‘the
effect of perfection or non-perfection’ and not to ‘priority’, while OPPSA section 7(1) refers to
both terms. For convenience, this article refers only to ‘priority’.
83 Even accepting the simplified assumption of widespread adoption of the Modern Principles, the
relevant STCOL rule should avoid even the possibility that a rule would point to the law of a State
that does not recognize registration as a method of perfection.
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There is no apparent reason why the same States’ law should not apply to per-
fection and priority alike. This is the situation under the STCOL rules proposed in
the draft Guide and provided in the Model Law and North American law.84
Consider next the interests of the States whose laws apply to registration in
those States’ registries. Those interests also would be served by adopting the same
applicable law for priority—otherwise the role of those States’ registries would be
diminished or rendered superfluous. On the other hand, the relative indifference
of third-party obligors to the law applicable to perfection would also extend to the
law applicable to priority.
B. Tangible assets
As just explained, it is appropriate for the same State’s law to apply both to
perfection of a security right in intangible assets by registration and also to pri-
ority of the security right. For tangible assets, however, under the Modern
Principles perfection may be achieved not only by registration but also by pos-
session. There are good reasons why a location-of-asset STCOL rule should apply
to priority for tangible assets even if a location-of-assignor rule applies (as sug-
gested here85) to perfection by registration. Specifically, for the same reasons that
the location-of-asset STCOL rule should apply to perfection by possession of
tangible assets (also as advocated here), that rule also should apply to priority
for tangible assets. Because assignees that perfect by possession or that take de-
livery as non-ordinary course of business buyers deal with tangible assets phys-
ically, considerations are implicated other than ‘where to search and register’ as in
the context of perfection by registration.
As explained above, the location-of-asset STCOL rule provides absolute clarity
for perfection by possession. It provides the same clarity as to priority and for the
same reason. Moreover, the Modern Principles favour perfection by possession by
affording priority to qualifying possessory security rights over those perfected by
registration.86 When applicable, those priority rules generally relieve the posses-
sory assignee that takes a security right from concerning itself (for example, by
searching) with any registration that might have been made. Modern Principles
also favour buyers of goods in the ordinary course of business. Such buyers gen-
erally take free of a conflicting security right in the seller’s inventory.87 Although
these ‘take-free’ priority rules may not specify the ordinary course buyer’s taking
84 Model Law art 86; UCC 9-301(1); OPPSA 7(1).
85 See pp 19–25 above. This discussion assumes, accordingly, that a location-of-assignor STCOL rule
applies to perfection by registration for tangible assets.
86 Model Law arts 46(1) (negotiable instruments); 49(1) (negotiable documents); 51(1) (certificated
non-intermediated securities); UCC 9-328 (5) (certificated securities); 9-330(a), (b) (chattel
paper), (d) (instruments); 9-331 (innocent acquisition under other UCC articles for negotiable
instruments, negotiable documents of title, and certificated securities); 9-333 (possessory statutory
liens); OPPSA 28(3) (chattel paper), 28(4) (instruments); 28.1(2) (innocent acquisition of certi-
ficated securities); 30.1(3) (certificated securities).
87 Model Law art 34(4); UCC 9-320(a), OPPSA 28(1).
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possession as a condition to protection,88 it is a safe assumption that the vast
majority of ordinary course buyers do in fact take possession of the goods in the
course of the transaction. Taking into account this treatment of possessory as-
signees and ordinary course buyers, a location-of-assignor STCOL rule for the
priority of these assignees and buyers would be odd, even incoherent.
Given the assumption of widespread adoption of the Modern Principles, one
might expect that in many cases the results of priority contests under priority
rules specifically embraced by Modern Principles would be similar under either a
location-of-asset or location-of-assignor STCOL rule. But that would not be the
case for many other priority contests as to which States have significant interests
in the STCOL rules for tangible assets within their borders. For example, putting
possession aside, the Modern Principles generally do not dictate the specific re-
quirements for good faith purchaser (innocent acquisition) protection for as-
signees of negotiable assets.89 In addition, there exist a plethora of statutory
and common law liens that vary enormously from State to State, relating to,
inter alia, environmental claims, assets used in criminal activity, protection of
employee claims, assets for which repair services have been performed, the pro-
vision of goods and services in connection with agricultural activity, tax claims,
and so on. These situations implicate priorities of claims to tangible assets that
sometimes may conflict with consensual security rights addressed by the Modern
Principles. They involve important public policies of States with respect to assets
physically located within their respective jurisdictions. All of these circumstances
support the adoption of a location-of-asset STCOL rule for priorities.
3. Creation
The creation, or existence, of a security right90 might be understood as a two-party,
assignor-to-assignee transaction or conveyance. Certainly, the effectiveness of a
transfer of a security right as between the parties is the essence or core of the
creation of a security right. On the other hand, creation also is a prerequisite for
the perfection (third-party effectiveness) of a security right and its priority vis-à-vis
competing claims to the same asset. In this latter sense, the interests of third parties,
assignors, and assignees in the STCOL rule applicable to the creation of a security
right would parallel precisely their respective interests in the STCOL rules affecting
perfection and priority. Whether conceptualized as a two-party matter (with third
parties having no real stakes in the matter) or a component of the perfection and
priority matrix, it is safe to presume that third parties would have little interest in
having a STCOL rule applicable to creation that differs from the rule (or respective
rules) applicable to perfection and priority. In any event, the appropriate STCOL
88 Possession or possessory rights are an express requirement for qualifying as a ‘buyer in ordinary
course of business’ under the UCC, however. UCC 1-201(9).
89 Cf. Model Law arts 46(2) (negotiable instruments); 49(3) (negotiable documents); 51(5) (non-
intermediated securities).
90 Recall that security rights include the interests of outright transferees of receivables. See p 3 above.
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rule applicable to creation has received much less attention, and has attracted much
less controversy, than the corresponding rules for perfection and priority.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Model Law generally applies the same
STCOL rules for creation as it does for perfection and priority. A location-of-
asset rule applies to tangible property and a location-of-assignor rule applies to
intangible property.91 The Canadian PPSAs take a similar approach to the ‘val-
idity’ of a security right, which would include (or amount to) creation for pur-
poses of STCOL rules.92 Assuming that these STCOL rules adopted by the Model
Law and the Canadian PPSAs are the appropriate ones, then the foregoing inter-
est-based and Modern Principles-based analyses of STCOL rules for perfection
and priority would apply equally as well to the issue of creation.
UCC Article 9 takes a different approach. The Article 9 STCOL rules are limited
to perfection and priority; they do not mention creation or validity.93
Consequently, the UCC’s generally applicable conflict-of-laws rules, including
the broad deference to party autonomy, apply to these issues.94 This invites con-
sideration of the multiple components that may be involved in the ‘creation’ of a
security right.
The most basic and obvious component of creation would be the formal re-
quirements for creation specified in the Model Law and under North American
law.95 In the North American domestic setting, these requirements are essentially
identical from State to State and province to province. So the law chosen to apply
to creation normally would be inconsequential.96 One of the formal requirements
is that the assignor ‘has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the
collateral’97 or ‘power to encumber’ the asset.98 One element of this requirement
is that the assignor be the right person to effect a transfer—that is, that it is
transferring an asset that belongs to it (and not to another) or that it is a
person with the power to transfer the asset. A second is that the asset itself be
transferable and not be subject to any restriction that would render a purported
transfer ineffective. Under the UCC party autonomy approach, it is likely that in
91 Model Law arts 85(1); 86.
92 See, e.g., OPPSA 5(1) (law of jurisdiction of location of asset governs validity as well as perfection
and priority for tangible assets); 7(1) (law of jurisdiction of location of debtor governs validity as
well as perfection and priority for intangible assets, mobile goods, and negotiable assets).
93 UCC 9-301 et seq. The concept of creation under the UCC involves the ‘attachment’ of a security
interest, which occurs when it becomes enforceable pursuant to the requirements specified in UCC
9-203 (see, in particular, UCC 9-203(b), which specifies the basic requirements). The same applies
under OPPSA. OPPSA11(1) (enforceability upon attachment), (2) (requirements for attachment).
The text uses the term ‘creation’ for consistency but it is intended to embrace attachment and
enforceability under UCC 9-203 and OPPSA 11.
94 UCC 1-301. See also pre-2001 UCC 1-105.
95 Model Law art 6(1); UCC 9-203(b); OPPSA 11(2).
96 The mutual rights and obligations of an assignor and assignee generally are governed by the law
they choose, or by other applicable choice-of-law rules in the absence of such a choice, under both
the Model Law and United States law. Model Law art 84; UCC 1-301. But that contractual
relationship is a part of ‘creation’ only in that an agreement is required for creation.
97 UCC 9-203(b)(2); OPPSA 11(2).
98 Model Law art 6(1).
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many circumstances the law chosen by the assignor and assignee to apply to the
secured transaction would not be applied to these elements.99 The assignor’s
rights are likely to be derived from a third party in a transaction (for example,
in which the assignor bought the asset) that is wholly unrelated to the secured
transaction between the assignor and assignee. Similarly, to the extent that the
alienability or inalienability of the asset implicates the rights of a third party (such
as the third-party obligor on TPO assets), assignor-assignee party autonomy
likely would not prevail.100 But I would speculate that the same results might
well obtain in these circumstances when the Model Law or a PPSA is the govern-
ing law. The law of the State of the assignor’s location (in the case of intangible
assets) or the location of the asset (in the case of tangible assets) also plausibly
would not be controlling. For TPO assets, the law governing the intangible (such
as the claim constituting a receivable) likely would control.
The harmony of law among the States renders the UCC’s party-autonomy
approach to creation largely benign. The approach taken by the Model Law
and the Ontario PPSA seems more promising and appropriate for States other
than those of the USA.101 The creation of a security right is the fulcrum upon
which rests third-party interests affected by perfection and priority rules. This
supports adoption of the more objectively ascertainable location-of-asset and
location-of-assignor STCOL rules. Even so, when the STCOL rule for creation
is compared to the rules for perfection and priority, the stakes are quite low.
4. Enforcement
A. Against assets and assignor
The Model Law contains a STCOL rule that addresses specifically the enforce-
ment102 of a security right in assets. For tangible assets, the applicable law is that of
the location of the asset at the time that enforcement commences.103 For intan-
gible assets, it is the law applicable to priority—the assignor’s location.104 Other
than the temporal component for tangible assets, these rules essentially mimic the
rules for creation, perfection, and priority. As with the creation issue, the UCC’s
generally applicable conflict-of-law rules apply to enforcement, thus accommo-
dating party autonomy.105 The PPSAs take the same approach as the UCC,
referring to the law of the assignor-assignee contract.106
99 See UCC 9-401, comment 3 (explaining limits on party autonomy and applicability of non-UCC law).
100 Ibid.
101 See p 30 above.
102 The enforcement of a security right should be distinguished from its enforceability, which gen-
erally is an attribute of creation or validity.
103 Model Law art 88(a). An exception is made for certificated non-intermediated securities, dis-
cussed below.
104 Ibid art 88(b). Exceptions are made for bank accounts, intellectual property, and uncertificated
non-intermediated securities.
105 See p 30 above.
106 OPPSA s 8(1)b) (substantive issues). As to procedural issues, the law of the jurisdiction where
enforcement is exercised applies. Ibid s 8(1)(a).
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These rules generally parallel the respective rules applicable to creation.107 For
this reason, they would meet the bilateral interests of assignors and assignees;
party autonomy as to the applicable law would in general accommodate and not
necessarily impair the interests of either party. But enforcement of a security right
against an encumbered asset also may have a direct effect on the interest of third
parties. For example, a junior interest may be extinguished by the enforcement of
a senior interest and the extinguishment of an assignor’s interest may have a direct
impact on the welfare of the assignor’s general creditors.108 It follows that the
STCOL rules under the Model Law that generally follow the rules for perfection
and priority would better meet the interests of third parties.
B. Against third-party obligors
The STCOL rule applicable to the enforcement of a security right against a third-
party obligor (which includes the effectiveness of the interest as against the ob-
ligor) is a core principle of any coherent STCOL regime. The Model Law
addresses these issues well by generally respecting overarching applicability of
the law governing the rights and obligations between third-party obligors and
assignors.109 That governing law applies to the rights and obligations between
third-party obligors and assignees, the conditions for enforcing a security right
against third-party obligors, including the effectiveness of any contractual restric-
tion on creation of a security right, and the discharge of obligations of third-party
obligors. North American law generally is in accord.110
The upshot of these STCOL rules is that the assignment of TPO assets and the
perfection and priority status of a security right so created would not enlarge or
enhance the obligations of a third-party obligor beyond those that would apply by
virtue of the obligor’s underlying contract111 and the otherwise applicable gov-
erning law. It follows that a third-party obligor would be indifferent as to per-
fection (for example, the rights of judgment creditors and the assignor’s
insolvency representative) or priority (which party, among competing claimants,
is entitled to benefits of the obligor’s obligations and to the enforcement against
the obligor). The third-party obligor’s obligations arise only under its contract
107 See pp 30–31 above.
108 See e.g., Model Law art 78(4) (notification to certain persons of disposition of collateral after
default); 81(4) (disposition discharges subordinate interests); UCC 9-611 (notification to certain
persons of disposition of collateral after default); 9-617(a)(3) (disposition discharges subordinate
interests); 9-618 (secondary obligors); OPPSA s 63(4) (notification to certain persons of dispos-
ition of collateral after default), (9) (disposition discharges subordinate interests).
109 Model Law art 96. Article 96 applies to third-party obligors on receivables, negotiable instru-
ments, and negotiable documents. Although it does not cover obligations of issuers of securities,
discussed below in subsection III.5. Model Law Article 100 provides a similar result.
110 See UCC 9-401, comment 3 (discussing issues, including restrictions on transfer, governed by
non-UCC law and not subject to party autonomy); 9-404 (third-party obligor’s defenses against
assignee), 9-406 (discharge of third-party obligor); OPPSA 40(1.1) (third-party obligor’s defenses
against assignee), (2) (discharge of third-party obligor).
111 For shorthand convenience references to the underlying ‘contract’ in this discussion include the
obligations of an obligor on a negotiable instrument or as an issuer of a negotiable document.
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and the law applicable to that contract. It follows that such obligors would not
only be indifferent as to perfection and priority but also as to the STCOL rules for
perfection and priority. Thus, these obligors would be indifferent as between a
law-governing-claim or location-of-assignor STCOL rule for perfection and pri-
ority as to assigned intangibles, inasmuch as obligations of the third-party obligor
would be the same regardless of which of those STCOL rules were to apply. If a
third-party obligor is bound to pay or render performance to an assignee, it is
because the underlying contract, the law applicable to that contract, or both
impose such an obligation.
5. The Model Law’s choice-of-law rule for certificated non-intermediated
securities: a puzzle and some lessons
The Model Law’s STCOL rule for certificated non-intermediated securities112
took shape only at the very end of the process. The inclusion of that rule offers
an object lesson for a faulty process in the harmonization of law, notwithstanding
the good faith of its proponents. But the origin of the problem remains a puzzle.
Article 100’s approach is inconsistent with the other important choice-of-law
principles enshrined in the Model Law and embodied in North American law.
Happily, if adopted by States it likely would have only a minimal detrimental
impact in the practical, transactional context. One is reminded of Grant Gilmore’s
famous commentary on the exclusion of set-off from the scope of Article 9 of the
UCC: ‘Of course a right of set-off is not a security interest and has never been
confused with one: the statute might as appropriately exclude fan dancing. . . .
[T]he exclusion . . . does no harm except to the dignity and self-respect of the
draftsmen.’113
Some background may be useful. The draft Guide excluded all securities from
its scope. This was in large part because during the draft Guide’s formative period
intermediated securities were being addressed by International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in connection with a project that resulted
in the adoption in 2009 of the Geneva Securities Convention, which covers
‘intermediated securities’.114 Non-intermediated securities were included
within the scope of the draft Model Law rather late in the deliberative process
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL)
Working Group VI.115 Consequently, the draft Guide itself offers no illumination
or background concerning the Model Law’s ultimate treatment of securities,
112 Model Law art 2(d) (defining ‘[c]ertificated non-intermediated securities’ as ‘non-intermediated
securities represented by a certificate that: (i) Provides that the person entitled to the securities is
the person in possession of the certificate; or (ii) Identifies the person entitled to the securities’.
‘Non-intermediated securities’ are ‘securities other than securities credited to a securities ac-
count’. Ibid art 2(w).
113 2 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965) s. 10.7, 315-16.
114 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (Geneva Securities
Convention) 2009 (Geneva), http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/geneva-con-
vention, art 1(2) (defining ‘intermediated securities’).
115 Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the Work of its Twenty-Seventh Session
(New York, 20–4 April 2015) at 3, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V15/
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including its relevant STCOL rules. Had security rights in non-intermediated
securities been the subject of careful analysis and debate in the process of de-
veloping the draft Guide, perhaps Article 100 would not exist in its present form,
if at all.
Certificated non-intermediated securities, like other negotiable assets (negoti-
able instruments and negotiable documents)116 and goods are ‘tangible assets’ as
defined in the Model Law.117 As such, perfection may be achieved either by
registration or possession.118 As discussed above, the Model Law adopts a loca-
tion-of-asset STCOL rule for tangible assets but provides an exception (among
other exceptions) for certificated non-intermediated securities.119 Article 100(1)
of the Model Law provides for equity securities: ‘The law applicable to the cre-
ation, effectiveness against third parties, priority and enforcement of a security
right in non-intermediated equity securities, as well as to its effectiveness against
the issuer, is the law under which the issuer is constituted.’120 Article 100(2)
provides, for debt securities, that the applicable law for the same matters ‘is the
law governing the securities’.121
Certificated non-intermediated securities are a type of TPO asset (the issuer
being the third-party obligor).122 As such, the ‘law under which the issuer [of
equity securities] is constituted’ and the ‘law governing . . . [debt] securities’, the
applicable laws provided by article 100, are analogous and equivalent to the law
governing a claim (such as a receivable). As explained above, a law-governing-
claim STCOL rule is suboptimal for the interests of third parties, assignors, and
assignees for perfection by registration and priority for intangible TPO assets,
such as receivables.123 Given this, why would the law-governing-claim STCOL
rule imposed by Article 100 be suitable for perfection by registration and priority
of security rights in certificated non-intermediated securities?124 The rule bears
029/20/PDF/V1502920.pdf ?OpenElement. The Model Law expressly excludes from its scope
intermediated securities. Model Law art 1(3)(c).
116 The Model Law uses the terms ‘negotiable instrument(s)’ and ‘negotiable document(s)’ but does
define either term. See, e.g., Model Law art 2(ll) (defining ‘tangible asset’).
117 Ibid.
118 Model Law art 18.
119 Model Law art 85(1).
120 Model Law art 100(1).
121 Ibid art 100(2). As already explained, Article 98 of the Model Law provides for a location-of-as-
signor STCOL rule for perfection by registration in negotiable assets if the law of the State of the
assignor’s location provides for perfection by registration for such assets. See p 24 above. But what
if the law of the assignor’s State does not so provide? In that case, one might have expected that the
Model Law’s generally applicable STCOL rule for tangible assets—the location-of-asset rule under
Article 85(1)—should apply. However, because Article 85(1) makes an exception for Article 100,
that article provides the general STCOL rule for perfection (whether by registration or by pos-
session) for non-intermediated securities.
122 See Introduction and section II.2.D in this article for a discussion of TPO assets.
123 See pp 15–17 above.
124 If the law of the State of an assignor’s location does not provide for the perfection of security rights
in certificated non-intermediated securities by registration in the security rights registry, Article
100’s law-governing-claim rule applies to perfection by registration (as well as by possession).
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no relationship to, or connection with, searching and registration in an assignor
identifier-based registry or any priority rules based on such registration.125
Consider also perfection by possession for certificated non-intermediated secu-
rities. For perfection by possession and priority for tangible assets, whether goods
or negotiable assets, the clear superiority of the location-of-asset STCOL rule also
was explained above.126 Based on that discussion, the Article 100 law-governing-
claim STCOL rule for certificated non-intermediated securities is anomalous, to
say the least, for possessory perfection and priority in such tangible assets. It is
noteworthy that under the Model Law certificated non-intermediated securities
are the only type of tangible asset for which a location-of-asset STCOL rule does
not apply for perfection and priority. For tangible assets, Article 9 of the UCC
applies the location-of-assignor rule to perfection by registration127 but applies
the location-of-asset rule to perfection by possession and to priority.128 For tan-
gible assets under the PPSAs, the location-of-asset rule applies to both perfection
and priority.129 None of these modern regimes adopts an article 100-type law-
governing-claim STCOL rule for perfection and priority for any type of tangible
asset—save only the Model Law’s Article 100 rule for certificated non-interme-
diated securities. And all of these modern regimes, excepting Article 100, provide
for a location-of-asset STCOL rule for perfection by possession and priority for
tangible assets, including certificated non-intermediated securities.
The foregoing presents the puzzle of Article 100: what is its rationale? Did the
process of deliberating, negotiating, and drafting the Model Law reveal something
about certificated non-intermediated securities that is materially different from
other tangible assets (which includes close cousins that reify intangibles and
goods, negotiable instruments and negotiable documents) and that the drafters
of North American law have missed? Apparently not—at least based on the record
discussed below.130 The location-of-assignor STCOL rule for perfection by regis-
tration in an assignor-identifier-based secured transactions registry and the loca-
tion-of-asset STCOL rule for perfection by possession of tangible assets each bears
a coherent relationship to those methods of perfection and the related priority
rules. Each serves the interests of third parties, assignors, and assignees. However,
the Article 100 law-governing-claim STCOL rule for certificated non-interme-
diated securities has no coherent relationship to those methods of perfection,
Concerns about bulk assignments, future arising assets, and suitability for international,
cross-border transactions may be less pronounced in the context of certificated non-interme-
diated securities than in the case of assignments of receivables. See pp 15–17 above. But this would
hardly seem sufficient to justify the law-governing-claim STCOL rule of Article 100. Moreover, I
am unaware that anyone has argued that these differences would support such a rule.
125 Ibid.
126 See pp 25–26, 28 above.
127 UCC 9-301(1).
128 UCC 9-301(2) (perfection and priority for possessory security interests), (3)(C) (priority for
non-possessory security interests).
129 OPPSA 5(1).
130 See pp 39–41 below.
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even though these are the only two methods of perfection for those assets under
the Model Law. The Article 100 rule simply ignores the important connection
between the appropriate STCOL rule and the public notice function of perfection
(and the relationship between perfection and priority).
One plausible solution to the puzzle of Article 100 (perhaps the most promising
one) may inhere in the connection between the law governing securities (the
Article 100 standard) and the commercial practices and expectations of assignors
and assignees of certificated non-intermediated securities (or, at least, some of
them). First, that law would be implicated in the determination of whether a non-
intermediated security is certificated security, a type of tangible asset, or an un-
certificated security (as to which Article 100’s law-governing claim STCOL rule
clearly is appropriate, as discussed below131). It is a reasonable assumption that,
putting the Model Law’s STCOL rules aside, the law governing TPO assets would
be the most appropriate one for such a characterization of securities as well as
for their alienability and for methods of third-party effectiveness.132 The
characterization of securities as certificated under the Model Law turns on
whether the securities are ‘represented by a certificate that: (i) Provides that the
person entitled to the securities is the person in possession of the certificate; or
(ii) Identifies the person entitled to the securities’.133 When does a certificate so
‘represent[]’ securities?
By taking this definition and a process of ‘reverse engineering’ based on the
Model Law’s rule permitting perfection in tangible assets (including certificated
non-intermediated securities) by possession, it is fair to infer (and conclude) that
securities are certificated if (i) delivery (possession) of the certificate relating to
the securities is or may be a material element in the effective transfer of the
securities and (ii) the certificate itself so indicates. This understanding of certifi-
cated non-intermediated securities does not exclude the possibility that under the
law governing the securities effective transfers could be made without delivery
(possession), as by registration in a security rights registry, or that steps in add-
ition to a delivery might be required for an effective transfer—such as registration
on the issuer’s register or notification to the issuer of the transfer—a ‘possession-
plus’ effectiveness rule.134 But this understanding would contemplate that, while a
131 See p 40 below.
132 See the discussion above of the creation of a security right and the alienability of assets. See pp
30–31 above.
133 Model Law art 2(d) (emphasis added). If the securities are not so represented by a certificate, they
are uncertificated. Ibid art 2(mm).
134 One might take a more narrow view of certificated securities under which they would include only
securities that, under the law governing the securities, a delivery-related transfer effective against
third parties may be made by delivery (possession) alone. That approach would mean that
securities subject to a ‘possession-plus’ rule would be uncertificated securities. Under that inter-
pretation, the Model Law would provide that (i) certificated securities (as defined in Model Law
Article 2(d)) include only those as to which possession is the sole method of possession-related
perfection and (ii) under Model Law Article 18(2) possession is an applicable method of perfec-
tion. Such an interpretation would render the Model Law’s perfection rule for certificated secu-
rities both circular and superfluous.
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person is in possession, that possession would preclude the effective transfer to
another person by delivery (possession).
Second, consider as well practices concerning registered certificated non-inter-
mediated securities—those as to which the certificate identifies a person entitled
to the securities and the issuer maintains a register of such entitled persons.135 In
some situations, an assignee may interact directly with the law governing secu-
rities by becoming the registered holder of the securities on the issuer’s register. As
Example 1, assume that the assignee chooses to do so in order to control voting
rights or to ensure collection of distributions, such as dividends. In Example 2, the
assignee chooses to become the registered holder (or ‘pledgee’) because under the
law governing the securities that registration is necessary, in addition to the de-
livery (possession) of security certificate, for the effectiveness of the assignment
against third parties—that is, pursuant to a ‘possession-plus’ perfection rule.136
These practical connections between an assignee and the law governing certifi-
cated non-intermediated securities are evocative of the argument, discussed
above, that a law-governing-claim STCOL rule is appropriate for perfection of
assignments of intangibles (such as receivables) because during the course of a
transaction a prospective assignee must consult the law governing a claim (here,
the law of the issuer of securities) in any event.137
This argument was adequately rebutted above in the discussion of assignments
of receivables.138 That rebuttal need not be repeated here. But, in the present
context of registered securities, the argument may have a greater appeal (but only
superficially) because of the posited direct and substantive connection between
the assignee and the issuer’s register of securities holders. The appeal is superficial,
however, because on closer examination it reflects an analytical laziness and a
fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant Model Law rules on perfection
and priority and the related STCOL rules.
In Example 1, the assignee’s wish to obtain protections as to voting and divi-
dends through issuer registration has nothing to do with its perfection by taking
physical possession of the certificated securities located in a jurisdiction that has
no necessary connection with the law governing the securities. That prophylactic
procedure (issuer registration) is functionally equivalent to an assignee of a re-
ceivable notifying the debtor of the receivable to remit payment directly to the
assignee, a step that also is wholly unrelated to perfection and priority.139 The
issue in question is the appropriate STCOL rule under the Model Law for the as-
signee’s perfection of its security right by taking possession of the certificated
135 This potential ‘solution’ would not support or explain the Article 100 approach for bearer
securities, however.
136 See, e.g., Laws of Cyprus (1959), ch. 149, Contract, art 138(2) (valid and enforceable pledge of
shares requires, inter alia, (i) notice of pledge to issuer, (ii) memorandum of pledge in issuer’s
register of shareholders, and (iii) delivery by issuer of memorandum of pledge made in register.
137 See pp 15–16 and n 42 above.
138 Ibid.
139 See Model Law art 63(2) (debtor of the receivable discharged only by paying the assignee follow-
ing notification to that debtor of the assignment of the receivable to the assignee).
878 Charles W. Mooney Jr.
Unif. L. Rev., Vol. 22, 2017, 842–884
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ulr/article-abstract/22/4/842/4828169
by guest
on 17 February 2018
security in the jurisdiction in which the certificate is physically located. As with
other tangible assets, the location-of-asset STCOL rule is the appropriate one for
perfection and priority of possessory security rights.140 While the location of an
issuer or its register may sometimes have been a proxy for fictionalizing a situs for
registered securities,141 under the Model Law perfection is achieved by possession
of the actual physical certificate, not by registration at a fictional location based on
the location of the issuer or its register.
Now consider Example 2, in which the law governing the securities provides
that registration on the issuer’s register is necessary, in addition to the delivery
(possession) of the security certificate, for third-party effectiveness (a ‘possession-
plus’ perfection rule). If a real-life assignee perceives (as it often might) that in the
event of a dispute or enforcement a plausible forum would be a court in the
issuer’s jurisdiction or any forum court with a STCOL rule that would apply
the law governing the security to perfection and priority, then the assignee
might well choose to become the registered holder so as to ensure perfection
were that law to be applied. Once again, however, these circumstances do not
support the adoption in the Model Law (or by any State, for that matter) of a
STCOL rule such as Article 100 that would point to the law of the issuer’s juris-
diction for perfection and priority. The Model Law has rejected, on the merits, a
possession-plus perfection rule and opted instead for a possession-only rule.142
The issue is the appropriate Model Law STCOL rule to govern perfection by
possession of certificated non-intermediated securities. The fact that in the real
world some assignees prudently choose to comply with possession-plus perfec-
tion rules of issuers’ jurisdictions as a practical measure does not bear on the
appropriate STCOL rule for the Model Law or otherwise for States to adopt.
The approach of Article 100 recognizes that for some assignees in some cir-
cumstances compliance with the (suboptimal, according to the Model Law) pos-
session-plus perfection requirements of the law governing the securities may not
be inconvenient. But it fails to recognize that such compliance may be quite
inconvenient for other assignees that wish merely to take possession of certificates
located in a jurisdiction with the Model Law’s method of perfection by a posses-
sion-only rule. Even in a forum sitting in a State that has adopted the Model law
and for certificated securities located in that State, Article 100 could require that
forum to apply a possession-plus perfection rule that the Model Law itself has
rejected! This illustrates the disconnect between the Model Law’s possession-only
perfection rule and the Article 100 law-governing-claim STCOL rule.
140 See pp 25–26, 28 above.
141 See Roy Goode, Hideki Kanda, and Karl Kreuzer, Hague Securities Convention Explanatory Report
(2005) 17.
142 The Model Law is replete with examples of alternative approaches, thus recognizing that adopting
States reasonably may make differing policy choices within the general parameters of the Modern
Principles as embodied in the Model Law. See, e.g., Model Law, ch IV (Model Registry
Provisions), arts 13 (Options A and B); 14 (Options A, B, and C); art 97 (Options A and B).
But the Model Law does not include any such possession-plus perfection rule, even as an
alternative.
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Is there an explanation for the Article 100 puzzle that is not subject to the
superficial appeal criticized above? Perhaps so, but it also is unsatisfying from
the perspective of the Model Law. Perhaps the root of the support for the Article
100 approach is the view that a superior perfection rule would be a possession-
plus rule that requires not only possession but also registration of the assignment
in the issuer’s register. On the merits, at least, this position would make some
sense. After all, if there are good reasons for some assignees to comply with issuer
registration in any event (such as in Examples 1 and 2 discussed above), why not
adopt possession-plus-registration as the applicable perfection rule? I will not
dwell on the reasons (of which there are many) for rejecting such a rule, including
the additional burdens that it would place on assignees acquiring possessory
security rights.143 Suffice it to note that the Model Law has itself rejected such
a rule by adopting a possession-only perfection rule.144
Article 100 also cannot be rationalized based on concerns for the interests of issuers
of certificated non-intermediated securities as third-party obligors. As explained
above, these concerns are dealt with adequately by the law-governing-claim rule
that applies to the issuers’ obligations.145 The relevant STCOL rules and the methods
of perfection and priority rules that regulate who is ultimately entitled to the secu-
rities do not affect or impair the rights and obligations of the issuers or the enforce-
ability of certificated non-intermediated securities against issuers. It follows that the
issuers should be indifferent as to the STCOL rules for perfection and priority.
Assets that are intangible and not represented by a res (such as a security cer-
tificate) include bank accounts, uncertificated securities, intermediated securities,
and securities accounts. For these intangible assets, a law-governing-claim
STCOL makes sense for perfection (other than perfection by registration in the
security rights registry) and priority.146 For example, under the Model Law per-
fection for uncertificated securities may be achieved by notation or entry on the
books of the issuer or pursuant to a control agreement.147 Similar methods are
provided under North American law.148 In general, these methods recognize that
143 Even if many, or even most, assignees seek such issuer-register protections (which I suspect is
highly unlikely), such a perfection rule would force many other assignees to deal with the issuer’s
books instead of simply taking possession of certificates under the Model Law’s possession-only
perfection rule.
144 In an analogous context, the Geneva Securities Convention was emphatic as to its ‘credit-only’
transfer rule. See Geneva Securities Convention (n. 114), art 11(1), (2) (emphasis added):
‘[I]ntermediated securities are acquired by an account holder by the credit of securities to that
account holder’s securities account. ... No further step is necessary, or may be required by the
non-Convention law or any other rule of law applicable in an insolvency proceeding, to render
the acquisition of intermediated securities effective against third parties.’
145 See pp 31–32 above.
146 As noted above, the Article 100 general rule applies, quite inappropriately, to perfection by
registration when the assignor is not located in a State the law of which provides for perfection
in securities by registration. See p 34 above.
147 Model Law art 27; see section II.2.C concerning other methods of perfection.
148 UCC 9-305(a)(2) (law of issuer’s jurisdiction governs perfection and priority for uncertificated
security); OPPSA 7.1(2) (law of issuer’s jurisdiction governs perfection and priority for uncer-
tificated security).
880 Charles W. Mooney Jr.
Unif. L. Rev., Vol. 22, 2017, 842–884
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ulr/article-abstract/22/4/842/4828169
by guest
on 17 February 2018
the issuers, intermediaries, and depository banks are the best ‘scorekeepers’ for
claims to and against these assets (again, putting aside registration in the security
rights registry). For these assets, Article 100, the Hague Securities Convention,
and North American law appropriately apply the law-governing-claim STCOL
rule.149
Working Group VI last considered the conflict-of-laws provisions of the draft
Model Law in October 2015. Draft Article 93, then before the Working Group,
provided three alternatives for certificated non-intermediated securities.150
Alternative A provided the usual rule for perfection and priority for tangible
assets—the location of the certificate.151 Alternative B provided that creation,
perfection, priority, enforcement, and effectiveness against the issuer would be
governed by the law ‘under which the issuer is constituted.’ Alternative C was
essentially the same as Article 100 as ultimately adopted—adopting the
Alternative B formulation for equity securities but substituting ‘the law governing
the securities’ for debt securities.
The principal advocate for the substance of Option C during the Working
Group deliberations was the Commercial Finance Association (CFA).152 The
CFA argued that (i) Alternative A was too complex, artificial, and unrealistic
(but without offering explanations for these conclusions);153 (ii) while
Alternative B was the simplest rule, it inappropriately gave identical treatment
to equity and debt securities; and (iii) Alternative C, consequently, was preferred
based on simplicity and efficiency. It also argued that the location-of-asset rule for
certificated non-intermediated securities would permit the ‘manipulation’ of the
applicable law. Some other delegations pointed out that Alternative A’s adoption
of the location-of-asset STCOL rule was consistent with the treatment for nego-
tiable instruments and negotiable documents, was most likely to attract a
149 Convention on Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities held with an
Intermediary, 2006 (The Hague), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/3afb8418-7eb7-4a0c-af85-
c4f35995bb8a.pdf, art 4(1) (law governing account agreement governs, inter alia, perfection
and priority for intermediated securities); UCC 9-304(1) (law of bank’s jurisdiction governs
perfection and priority for deposit accounts); 9-305(3) (law of securities intermediary’s jurisdic-
tion governs perfection and priority for security entitlements and securities accounts); OPPSA
(law of securities intermediary’s jurisdiction governs perfection and priority for security entitle-
ments and securities accounts).
150 Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions art 93, A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.65/Add.4, 12–14 (28 July
2015) (July 2015 Draft).
151 It also provided that the same rule would apply to creation, that enforcement would be governed
by the law of the State where the act of enforcement occurs, and that the effectiveness of a security
right against the issuer would be governed by the law of the State of the constitution of the issuer.
Ibid.
152 UNCITRAL, Working Group VI, audio recording (16 October 2015) (October Recording),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp. The discussion that follows is based on
this recording.
153 For certificated non-intermediated securities, Alternative A provided that (i) creation, perfection
and priority is governed by the law of the location of the security certificate, (ii) enforcement is
governed by the State in which enforcement takes place, and (iii) the effectiveness of a security
right against the issuer is governed by the law of the State of the issuer’s constitution. These are
essentially equivalent to the rules applicable under that same draft for other tangible assets and
third-party obligors. July 2015 Draft (n. 150), arts 79(1); 82(a); 89(a). Given that, the CFA’s
characterizations are puzzling.
Choice-of-law rules for secured transactions 881
Rev. dr. unif., Vol. 22, 2017, 842–884
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ulr/article-abstract/22/4/842/4828169
by guest
on 17 February 2018
consensus in a model law, reflected a pragmatic and well-known rule, and would
not undo progress already made.154 But, in the end, the USA’s suggestion—that
all alternatives received some support and should be retained—carried the day.155
The draft submitted to UNCITRAL in July 2016 contained all three
alternatives.156
The deliberations leading to UNCITRAL’s adoption of Alternative C of the
Draft Article 97 (now Article 100) are particularly opaque as to substance. The
entire floor discussion of the article occupied only slightly more than four mi-
nutes’ time.157 Canada led by noting that notwithstanding its written comments it
supported Option C and the deletion of Options A and B. By way of explanation,
it noted that its change of position demonstrated ‘the purpose of informal con-
sultations’ in the evolution of views of delegations. The USA, Spain, the CFA, and
the United Kingdom followed suit. The deed was done. Canada’s reference to
consultations and the CFA’s expression of gratitude for the evolved views of
delegations (that is, support for Alternative C) offers a hint as to motivations
but offers no glimpse of the underlying substance.158 The CFA’s intervention
repeated its earlier assertions of simplicity, promotion of uniformity, and the
like. Most remarkably, however, the CFA also asserted that the location of a
security certificate bears no relation to the relevant transaction—quite an as-
tounding proposition inasmuch as a principal issue was the STCOL rule for
perfection by an assignee’s physical possession of the certificate.
This subsection of the article has digressed from its otherwise policy-oriented
and technical approach to consider the lessons learned from the saga of Article
100. What are the lessons? First, one hopes that had the discussions embraced
something like the interest-based and Modern Principles-based framework
advanced here, perhaps the clear disconnect between the Article 100 approach,
on the one hand, and the Model Law’s rules on perfection by registration, per-
fection by possession, and priority, on the other, would have produced a different
result. But perhaps a frank confrontation of the merits was never in the cards.
During the deliberations on the STCOL rule for certificated non-intermediated
securities, the proponents of the Article 100 law-governing-claim rule never ex-
plained why the rule for those assets should differ from the rule for other tangible
assets, including negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and goods. Nor
was any explanation forthcoming as to why the rules for those other assets should
154 October Recording, interventions of Canada, France, Switzerland, and Korea.
155 October Recording, intervention of United States.
156 Draft Model Law on Secured Transactions art 97, A/CN.9/884/Add.4, 7-8 (17 March 2016).
Alternative A of that draft was modified to include alternative paragraphs contemplating the
possibility of different treatment for debt securities, similar to that provided in Alternative C.
157 UNCITRAL, 49th Session, audio recording (29 June 2016), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
audio/meetings.jsp. The discussion that follows is based on this recording.
158 Shortly after the UNCITRAL meeting I consulted with representatives of two expert delegates of
prominent States, who participated in the meeting, as to how and why Article 100 had emerged.
One explained that it resulted from ‘effective and powerful lobbying’ and another was surprised
and unaware of what had transpired during the four-plus minutes of discussion.
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not be conformed to the Article 100 approach. If there are good reasons for these
differences, one wonders why they were not mentioned on the record during the
process. This sparse record, especially when considered with the off-the-record,
apparently outcome-determinative consultations mentioned on the record, re-
flects poorly on the intergovernmental harmonization process. But this should
not detract from the overall success and high quality of the Model Law project.
A second lesson learned is procedural. It is the need to encourage a clear and
more complete record of a harmonization project, especially when it deviates
sharply from principles that it otherwise embraces—here, the Model Law’s
STCOL rules. Article 100 reflects an abject failure of transparency in the process
of reform and harmonization of law. A third lesson is substantive and related to
the second. It is the need to adopt a coherent framework for assessing STCOL
rules, such as the framework proposed here. The incoherence of Article 100 re-
flects the importance of recognizing and heeding the necessary connections be-
tween rules on perfection and priority and the corresponding STCOL rules.
This story of Article 100 concludes on three happier notes. First, the Model Law
is just that. It is not a real law, and it is not a convention. It is doubtful that States
actually will adopt the Article 100 approach. Second, the Article 100 approach did
not infect the other STCOL rules for tangible assets, which generally are salutary.
Third, even if adopted by States, Article 100 likely would have very little practical
effect. I suspect that in the vast majority of circumstances the applicable law under
that provision and under a conventional location-of-asset STCOL rule would be
the same. Securities that are traded actively on exchanges and other trading plat-
forms today are largely intermediated securities that are dematerialized or immo-
bilized within a central securities depository. Certificated securities to which
Article 100 would apply typically are issued by small- to medium-sized enterprises
and closely held or else are issued by subsidiaries and affiliates forming parts of
corporate groups (including multinational enterprise groups). In these situations,
the locations of the certificates and the applicable law under Article 100 are likely
to converge. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily so. Were it adopted, Article
100’s incoherence could yet harbour mischief.
IV. Conclusion
This article has proposed, applied, and tested a framework for assessing STCOL
rules. The framework for assessment suggested here takes account of the interests
of the relevant stakeholders (third parties in general, assignors, assignees, third-
party obligors on TPO assets, and States) together with the emerged and emerging
Modern Principles. In advocating for this interest-based, Modern Principles-
based framework, I do not suggest that earlier commentary and law reform efforts
generally have failed to consider the relevant interests and principles of secured
transactions law or generally have reached conclusions and supported STCOL
rules that reflect bad public policy. I do claim, however, that earlier assessments
and developments of STCOL rules could have benefited from a more systematic
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approach towards a statutory dépeçage that takes into account, in particular, the
relationships between STCOL rules and the relevant components of secured
transactions law—creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement (against assi-
gnors and third-party obligors).
Taking the Model Law as its exemplar, the article considers how the application
of the framework might have facilitated a richer, more nuanced approach to the
Model Law’s STCOL rules. In particular, application of the framework might have
resulted in a different approach for perfection by registration in tangible assets (a
location-of-assignor rule as opposed to the Model Law’s generally applicable
location-of-asset rule). And it almost certainly would have identified a STCOL
rule quite differently from Article 100 for perfection and priority for certificated
non-intermediated securities. But I should reiterate the point made in the intro-
duction; this application of the interest-based and Modern Principles-based
framework and the resulting conclusions necessarily are based on the factual
assumptions and judgments that I have made as to the various stakeholder inter-
ests and the impact of STCOL rules on those interests and on the implementation
of the Modern Principles. In that connection, my chief assertion is the utility and
suitability of the framework for assessment proposed here, not the conclusions
that I have reached.
UNCITRAL should (quite deservedly) bask in the success of completing the text
of its Model Law. But we should appreciate, and anticipate, that secured trans-
actions law may yet experience radical transformations in the twenty-first
century—some currently imaginable and some not so. New technologies may
transform the field. These may include distributed ledger technology (that is,
‘blockchain’), new self-contained systems within which assets are created and
identified and interests in assets are transferred and extinguished, and the devel-
opment of international and multinational registries.159 These and other devel-
opments will challenge conventional thinking and call into question past
approaches to secured transactions law, including the STCOL rules. Perhaps
this article will provide some beneficial insights along the way.
159 See generally Charles W Mooney, Jr, ‘Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of The Future’
(2017) 81(1) Law and Contemporary Problems (forthcoming); Teresa Rodrı́guez de las Heras
Ballell, ‘Digital Technology-Based Solutions for Enhanced Effectiveness of Secured Transactions
Law: The Road to Perfection?’ (2017) 81(1) Law and Contemporary Problems (forthcoming).
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